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This study examines the reactions of market makers and investors to large
dividend increases to identify the motives for dividend increases.  Uniquely, this study
simultaneously tests the signaling and agency abatement motivations as explanations of
the impact of dividend increases on stock prices and bid-ask spreads.  The agency
abatement hypothesis argues that increased dividends constrict management's future
behavior, abating the agency problem with shareholders.  The signaling hypothesis
asserts that dividend increases signal that managers expect higher or more stable cash
flows in the future.
Mean stock price responses to dividend increase announcements during 1995 are
examined over both short (1, 0) and long (1, 504) windows.  Changes in bid-ask
spreads are examined over a short (1, 0) window and an intermediate (81 day) period. 
This study partitions dividend increases into a sample motivated by agency abatement
and a sample motivated by cash flow signaling.  Further, this study examines the agency
abatement and cash flow signaling explanations of relative bid-ask spread responses to
announcements of dividend increases.  Estimated generalized least squares models of
market reactions to sampled events support the agency abatement hypothesis over the
cash flow signaling hypothesis as a motive for large dividend increases as measured by
Tobin’s Q and changes in the distribution of cash flows.
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A cash dividend payment represents the decision that an increased portion of the
shareholders’ wealth should be held outside rather than inside the firm.  For years,
financial economists have been puzzled by and corporations have struggled with the issue
of dividend policy.  Inquiry into corporate dividend policy changed dramatically with
Miller and Modigliani (1961).  Under a restrictive set of assumptions, they show the
independence of firm value and dividend policy.  After a brief period of debate, the Miller
and Modigliani dividend irrelevance proposition became widely accepted and research
has focused on the effect of relaxing the various Miller-Modigliani assumptions.  This is
natural, since the world we live in exhibits imperfections such as taxes, transaction costs,
information asymmetry, and manager-shareholder agency conflict.  Since Miller and
Modigliani's dividend irrelevance proposition, researchers and theorists have searched for
and proposed a number of dividend relevance theories.  The three prominent dividend
relevance theories are tax clientele effects, agency abatement, and informational
signaling.  The tax clientele effect is beyond the scope of this research.  It should be noted
that the period under study is between the major tax changes involving the treatment of
capital gains that occurred in 1986 and 1997.  There was no tax differential in this period
between dividends and realized capital gains.
2
Purpose of the Study
This study examines the reactions of market makers and investors to large
dividend increases to identify the motives for dividend increases.  Specifically, this study
tests the signaling and agency abatement motivations as explanations of the impact of
dividend increases on stock prices and bid-ask spreads.  This study investigates which
theory does the better job of explaining the market response and whether the theories
apply equally to the responses of market makers and the market as a whole.
This paper examines and tests the role of both the agency abatement and signaling
theories in dividend policy while holding constant tax effects.  Prior work has tended to
emphasize one or the other.  For example, Rozeff (1982) focuses on agency abatement,
while Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) focus on dividend signaling.
The agency abatement hypothesis argues that increased dividends constrict
management's future behavior, reducing the agency problem with shareholders.  The
agency abatement hypothesis is explained in more detail in Chapter II.
The agency abatement hypothesis competes with but is not mutually exclusive to
the signaling hypothesis.  The signaling hypothesis asserts that dividend increases signal
that management expects higher or more stable cash flows. Chapter II explains the
signaling hypothesis in more detail.  This paper clarifies the distinctive implications of
these two theories and then tests between them using bid-ask spread and stock price
responses to dividend increase announcements. 
This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences in the stock price
reaction and revision in relative bid-ask spread among firms with varying dividend yields,
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information environment, degrees of the shareholder-manager agency problem, and the
motivation to signal a change in the distribution of  cash flows.  If dividend increases
constrain management’s future behavior, reducing the agency conflict with shareholders
either by monitoring and conveying information about management behavior or more
directly by reducing free cash flow, dividend increases should result in a narrowing of the
relative bid-ask spread.  Furthermore, the association should be strongest for firms with a
high degree of agency costs of equity.  Additionally, there should be a positive
relationship between announcement period abnormal returns and dividend increases with
the presence of a high degree of agency cost of equity intensifying the relationship.
Also, this work examines whether dividend increases impart important insight to
the market concerning future cash flows.  Watts (1973) and Benartzi, Michaely, and
Thaler (1997) provide evidence that changes in dividends have little predictive ability
concerning earnings.  Yet, it is clear that the market believes that it is receiving
information from dividend increases.  Indeed, Mozes and Rapaccioli (1998) provide
evidence that analysts are able to separate between dividend increases that signal
increased future earnings and those that signal decreased future earnings.
This work differs from previous work in that it examines the mitigating effects of
agency costs of equity and dividend signaling needs upon the relative bid-ask spread in
addition to stock price changes.  Howe and Lin (1992) document a negative relation
between dividend yield and bid-ask spreads.  However, their evidence is consistent with
both the agency abatement and signaling theories.  Through testing the hypotheses
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described below, this work attempts to distinguish between the two alternative hypotheses.
One important practical benefit of clarifying the link between dividend policy and
bid-ask spread would be the application to the firm's cost of capital.  Amihud and
Mendelson (1986) propose that investors require compensation for their trading cost,
including spread.  They demonstrate a direct relationship between risk-adjusted stock
returns and the bid-ask spread.  This implies that the cost of capital is an increasing
function of the bid-ask spread.  Because the present value of the firm’s expected future
cash flows is a decreasing function of the cost of capital, holding all else equal,
shareholder wealth may be inversely related to the bid-ask spread.  Then, the firm’s
managers may have an incentive to pursue spread reducing policies.
Research Question
Consistent with the purpose of the study, the following research question is
presented as the framework from which the research hypotheses are developed.  Which of
two hypotheses, the cash flow signaling hypothesis or the agency abatement hypothesis,
better explains the response of stock market participants to large dividend increase
announcements?  The research hypotheses are developed using this question and are
discussed in Chapter III.
Chapter Summary
Financial economists continue to be puzzled by dividend policy and have failed to
provide clear direction to corporations.  Among the primary explanations for dividend
policy are the cash flow signaling and the agency abatement explanations.  This study
5
tests the signaling and agency abatement explanations of the impact of dividend increases
on stock prices and bid-ask spreads.   This study investigates which theory does the better
job of explaining the market response and whether the theories apply equally to the
response of market makers and the market as a whole.  The study is unique in its
partitioning of a sample of dividend increases into those whose decision is most likely to
be motivated by agency abatement and by those most likely to be motivated by cash flow
signaling.  Further, this study is unique in its empirical examination of the agency
abatement and cash flow signaling explanations by employing relative bid-ask spread
responses to announcement of dividend increases. 
Short-term price responses to sampled dividend increases support the agency
abatement hypothesis over the hypothesis that dividend increases signal an increase in the
level of cash flows.  However, short-term stock price responses fail to distinguish
between the agency abatement hypothesis and the hypothesis that dividend increases
signal a reduction in the volatility of cash flows.  Long-term stock price responses to
sampled events support the agency abatement hypothesis, but not the cash flow signaling
hypothesis.  Initial bid-ask spread responses support neither the agency abatement nor
cash flow signaling hypothesis, in this sample.  However, intermediate-term bid-ask
spread responses support the agency abatement hypothesis over the hypothesis that
dividend increases signal an decrease in volatility of cash flows.  Intermediate-term bid-
ask spread responses fail to differentiate between the agency abatement hypothesis and




This literature review examines the theoretical and empirical evidence from the
dividend literature.  There are five primary strands of corporate dividend policy literature: 
dividend irrelevance, return reaction to dividend announcement events, agency cost
abatement theory, signaling theory, and tax effects.  Tax effects are beyond the scope of
this paper.  This literature review is divided into eight sections.  Section one reviews the
literature of dividend irrelevance.  Section two surveys the existing work on the stock
price reaction to dividend changes.  The next two sections detail the work on the
shareholder/manager agency conflict with the first section looking at the theoretical work
and the second section examining the empirical work.  Similarly, the following two
sections explore the literature on the cash flow signaling hypothesis with the two sections
examining the theoretical and empirical work. The seventh section reviews the
components of dealer bid-ask spread and how the micromarkets may provide evidence on
the information provided by changes in dividends.  Finally, the work reviews the scant
evidence on bid-ask spread and dividend policy.  It is found that the literature is not
conclusive concerning any of these issues.
7
Dividend Irrelevance
Under conditions of perfect capital markets with all information possessed by
management (including investment policy) known by investors, the absence of taxes on
dividends and capital gains, the absence of transaction costs (i.e., individuals can
costlessly buy and sell securities), rational investors with homogeneous expectations, and
no agency costs associated with stock ownership,  Miller and Modigliani (1961)
demonstrate that the value of the firm is independent of dividend policy.  Firms can
finance any level of payout and investment without affecting firm value.  The
independence of investment and dividend policies is strongly supported by Smirlock and
Marshall’s (1983) application of a Granger causality test.  Like Miller and Modigliani,
Smirlock and Marshall do not account for market imperfections.  Partington (1985) also
finds investment and dividend policies to be independent and that it is the financing
decision, not the dividend decision, that is made on a residual basis.
Stock Price Reaction to Dividend Changes
The positive correlation between stock-price changes and the announcements of
dividend changes has been found in several empirical works.  These studies indicate that
the market finds a change in dividends to be newsworthy and there are possible benefits
to paying cash dividends.  Studies by Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Wansley
et al. (1991), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and others find that mean risk-
adjusted stock returns around the announcement of a dividend change are positively
associated with the change in the dividend.  Pettit (1972) also finds that the stock price
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reaction is strongest for the largest dividend changes.  Pettit’s results for the dividend
increase group and the dividend decrease group were similar in magnitude.  However,
Aharony and Swary (1980) find that the absolute value of the abnormal returns for the
dividend decrease group is greater than for the dividend increase group.  Brickley (1983)
focuses on specially designated dividends (SDDs).  Consistent with signaling theory,
Brickley finds that both SDDs and unlabeled dividend increases convey good news with
unlabeled dividend increases providing the more positive information.
Of all dividend policy changes, initiations and omissions may be the least likely to
be anticipated and those contain the most new information.  Asquith and Mullins (1983)
report a two-day announcement return of 3.7% for a sample of 168 firms that initiate
dividends.  Healy and Palepu (1988) examine the mean two-day announcement return
around dividend omissions and initiations.  The mean two-day announcement abnormal
return for the omission firms is -9.5% and is significant at the 0.01 level.  For dividend
initiation firms, the mean announcement abnormal return is 3.9% and is significant at the
0.01 level.  The results of Healy and Palepu are reminiscent of Aharony and Swary (1980)
in that there is an asymmetric response to omissions and initiations.
On the other hand, Watts’ (1973) examination of abnormal returns associated with
unexpected dividend changes indicates very little difference between the price responses
to unexpected dividend increases and decreases.  However, Watts uses monthly returns to
calculate abnormal returns.  More recent studies have used greater precision.  Another
reason that Watts may have found little evidence of information content for dividends is
that he randomly selected his sample.  It may be that dividend changes contain
9
informational content only when they are somewhat extreme.  Then, this paper attempts
to increase the ability to detect any informational content of dividends with respect to
agency and signaling by including only dividend increases with magnitude of at least ten
percent in the sample.
Dividends and the Shareholder/Management
Agency Problem--Theory
Easterbrook (1984), Rozeff (1982, 1986), and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
maintain that dividends mitigate the shareholder/management agency problem (the
agency costs of equity).  In this paper, this contention is labeled the agency abatement
hypothesis.  This agency problem is detailed in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen
(1986).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that the corporate manager acts on behalf of the
stockholders.  However, the manager has an incentive to divert firm resources to his own
benefit, e.g., obtaining plush offices.  There will be some divergence of managerial
incentive from shareholder wealth maximization anytime the owner/manager (the
entrepreneur) has less than 100% ownership.  Jensen and Meckling argue that "agency
costs" result from this divergence of resources from the maximization of shareholder
welfare.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of (1) the monitoring
expenditures by the principal including compensation polices, (2) the bonding
expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss.  Bonding costs are resources
expended by the agent to guarantee that the agent will not take certain actions which
would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if the agent
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does take such actions.  The residual loss is due to imperfectly constructed contracts and
is the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to the
divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximize the
welfare of the principal.  In other words, the residual loss is incurred because the cost of
full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits.  Then, agency costs include both the
cost of trying to align the objectives of the principals and the agent as well as the costs
associated with unaligned objectives.
One possible result of the shareholder/manager agency problem is overinvestment. 
Jensen (1986) argues that public corporations with substantial free cash flow will tend to
overinvest by accepting projects with negative net present values.  The overinvestment is
financed through internally generated cash (i.e., free cash flow).  Jensen defines free cash
flow as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net
present values.
Jensen (1989) provides four reasons for the tendency of management to use cash
for wasteful investments rather than pay it out to shareholders.  First, through the use of
free cash flow, managers are able to avoid monitoring associated with raising new cash in
the capital markets.  Retaining cash gives managers more autonomy from the capital
markets.  Second, increased firm size enhances executive pay.  Third, bias toward growth
develops because companies tend to reward middle managers through promotions rather
than performance bonuses.  Then the firm must grow in order to generate the new
positions necessary for promotion.  Finally, growth enhances the prestige and power of
senior management.
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Jensen (1994) supplies the tire industry as an example of the problems with
managerial discretion.  Because radial tires last three to five times longer than bias-ply
tires, world-wide tire capacity had to shrink by about 66%.  Tire companies dramatically
increased investment in R & D and marketing for their tire business.  In such situations
managers attitude has been, "This is a very tough business.  We have to make major
investments so that we have a chair when the music stops."  While such behavior is not
optimal for shareholders or society at large, it is obvious that managers would find it
difficult to initiate a shutdown when such action creates uncertainty and may sidetrack
their personal careers.
Jensen (1986) argues that stockholder gains from the decision to go private is due
to the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow.  Lehn and Polsen
(1989) find support for this theory.  They find a significant positive relationship between
undistributed cash flow and the going private transaction.  Additionally, premiums paid to
stockholders are positively related to undistributed cash flow.
Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982, 1986) assert that dividends play a role in
reducing the agency cost of equity.  Therefore, the agency cost of equity creates a demand
for dividends.  Rozeff argues that dividend payments reduce the costs stemming from
separation of ownership and control by providing additional information to investors
about the actions and intentions of management.  Unless the firm is able to finance new
investment with retained earnings, higher dividends require external funding.  With
external financing, significant flotation costs will be paid to investment bankers. 
Stockholders recognize that dividends are offset by costly new financings.  The suppliers
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of new capital require disclosure of the use of the funds.  Current shareholders are likely
to receive new information from this process.
An alternative to the use of dividends to convey information is to retain the funds
and inform shareholders through more direct means--letters, announcements, and
presentations.  Rozeff argues that dividends are a more efficient and convincing means to
convey information concerning the use of funds.  Howe and Lin (1992) note that this
information should also be available to the dealer, reducing the costs of informational
asymmetry and lowering the bid-ask spread.  Rozeff (1982) argues that the optimal
dividend payout minimizes the sum of flotation costs associated with external financing
and implicit agency costs of equity.  He argues that there may be a trade-off between the
flotation costs of raising external capital and the benefit of reduced agency costs when the
firm increases its dividend payout.  Thus, the value of the firm may not be independent of
dividend policy.  Instead, an optimal dividend policy exists.  Additionally, Easterbrook
(1984) argues that due to dividend induced external financing, the firm’s managers are
monitored by providers of new capital, investment bankers, and regulators.
Jensen (1986) maintains that managers of firms with substantial free cash flow
need to be motivated to disgorge the cash rather than overinvest or waste it on
inefficiencies.  Both dividends and debt service pay out current cash.  However, Jensen
argues that debt creation is a stronger mechanism than dividend increases in bonding
managers to invest only in high-return projects.  He notes that promises of permanent
increases in the dividend can be broken.  Debt results in a strong bond to pay out future
cash flows because debtholders have the right to take a firm into bankruptcy court if they
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do not make interest and principle payments.  However, Hansen, Kumar, and Shome
(1994) note that too much debt can increases the cost of financial distress and the cost of
debt contracting.  Then, debt creation and dividend payments can be viewed as weapons
in an arsenal capable of combating the agency conflict between managers and
shareholders.  If the firm retains earnings, an agent has direct and immediate control over
these funds.  If the earnings are paid as cash dividends, the control of these funds passes
to the hands of the principals.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provide a model in which small shareholders
(normally individuals) prefer capital gains to dividends while large shareholders (often
corporations) prefer dividends.  The payment of dividends to large shareholders
compensates them to remain shareholders and to monitor management.  Then, the
payment of dividends reduces the agency cost of equity.
Crockett and Friend (1988) note that reduction of agency costs of equity through
cash dividends would be a true rationale for dividend preference.  They compare it to
investor preference for reduced transaction costs and liquidity risks.
Dividends and the Agency Costs of
Equity--Empirical Evidence
Rozeff (1982, 1986) uses a multiple cross-sectional regression model that
regresses dividend payout against independent variables that include proxies for the
agency costs of equity and transaction costs.  As proxies for agency costs, Rozeff uses
two variables.  The first is the percentage of stock held by insiders and is used as a
negative surrogate for agency costs.  The second proxy for agency costs is natural log of
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the number of stockholders.  He finds that inside ownership is negatively related to and
the number of shareholders is positively related to the dividend payout ratio.
Dempsey and Laber (1992) update Rozeff's study and show similar results. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) find that managerial ownership, financial leverage, and
dividend policy are determined jointly determined by management in order to control the
agency costs of equity.  Jensen, Solber, and Zorn (1992) find that high insider ownership
firms choose lower levels of dividends.  Jahera, Lloyd, and Modani (1986) use the
percentage of stock held by the dominant shareholder or a dominant family complex as a
proxy for agency costs.  Their results support Rozeff in that they find inside ownership is
negatively related to the payout ratio and the number of shareholders is positively related
to the dividend payout ratio.  Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) examine all-equity firms. 
They find that firms with a low percentage of outstanding equity owned by managers
have higher dividend payout ratios, suggesting that dividends are used to reduce agency
costs in all-equity firms.  Consistent with the agency abatement hypothesis Hansen,
Kumar, and Shome (1994) find that utilities use dividend-induced equity financing to
control costs from stockholder-manager agency conflicts. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) test the hypothesis that for firms which overinvest,
higher dividends mitigate the overinvestment problem by reducing free cash flow.  Lang
and Litzenberger use Tobin's Q as a negative proxy for overinvestment.  A Q ratio under
unity is considered to indicate overinvestment.  A ratio above one is believed to indicate
value-maximization.  They find that the dividend announcement effect is more
pronounced for companies with average Q's less than unity.  In contrast to Lang and
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Litzenberger (1989), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994) find that announcement period
excess returns are unrelated to Tobin's Q.  They simultaneously control for the
standardized dividend change, dividend yield, and Tobin's Q.
Alli, Khan, and Ramirez (1993) use factor analysis and multiple regression in a
two step procedure to explain dividend payout policy.  Their findings support the role of
dividends in reducing agency problems.  Kallapur (1994) finds that earnings response
coefficients are positively related to payout ratios.  This implies that shareholders value
earnings more highly if a larger portion will be immediately paid out rather than retained
and perhaps wasted.  However, he fails to find the earnings response coefficient-payout
association for a sample of “free cash flow firms.”  Kallapur also finds that firms earn a
lower rate of return on projects financed by retained earnings than that earned by market
return proxies.  Moh d, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) use time-series cross-sectional analysis
to show that managers adjust the dividend payout ratio in response to the agency
cost/flotation cost structure.  Chen and Steiner (1999) use a nonlinear simultaneous
equation technique to examine the interrelationships among managerial ownership, risk
taking, debt policy, and dividend policy.  They find substitution-monitoring effects
between managerial ownership and dividend policy.
The Signaling Hypothesis--Theory
The signaling hypothesis holds that dividend changes signal information about
either the cash flow or earnings probability distributions of the firm.  Miller and
Modigliani (1961) suggest that dividends may convey manager’s inside information about
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future cash flows when markets are less than perfect.  The models begin with the idea that
management has valuable inside information that outside investors do not know.  Such
information would include unannounced sales and cost figures and the firm's investment
opportunity set.  If management has information about future and/or current cash flows
that investors do not have, the market will take dividends changes as well as nonchanges
as providing insight into management's assessment of the firm's future cash flows. 
Positive dividend changes will be viewed as good news with respect to cash flows.  That
is, management expects that cash flows will be higher and/or more stable (see Kale and
Noe 1990), meaning that the distribution of cash flows has shifted rightward and/or has
become less dispersed.  Negative dividend changes signal that management expects
permanently lower cash flows and/or less stable cash flows.  The regularity of the
quarterly dividend payment which many companies pay ensures a periodic flow of
information.  Therefore, information provided in dividends results in a lower level of
information asymmetry than would exist without such a signal.
A common view of dividend policy holds that managers make dividend increases
only when management is relatively confident that the higher payments can be
maintained, meaning that management believes that earnings have permanently increased. 
This idea has roots in Lintner's (1956) study on dividend policy.  Lintner surveyes
corporate managers.  His survey suggests that firms have long-run target dividend payout
ratios.  However, when earnings change, the firm moves only partway toward their target
payout.  Then, Lintner's model suggests that the dividend depends in part on the firm's
current earnings and in part on the previous dividend.  Lintner reports that managers are
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reluctant to make sharp changes in dividends and do so only when the earnings potential
of the firm has changed.  Then the level of dividend payments selected will become a
quasi-fixed expense of the company.  Fama and Babiak (1968) report results consistent
with this hypothesis.  Dividend payments only partially adjust to changes in corporate
profits.  Black (1976) finds that managers are especially reluctant to reduce dividends.
Pettit (1972) relies on the inflexibility of dividends described by Lintner (1956). 
If dividends are "sticky", then dividends changes can provide the market with insight into
management's assessment of long run cash flows and liquidity.  Managers tend to increase
dividends only when the probability of achieving cash flow levels adequate to support the
new payment level is high and decrease dividends only when the likelihood of supporting
present dividend levels is low.  Over time, knowledge of this managerial behavior pattern
is built into investor perceptions of dividend policy changes.  Then, in efficient markets,
positive dividend change is viewed as "good news"  and negative dividend change is
viewed as "bad news."  Thus, dividends provide utility in the form of information.
Akerlof (1970) shows the possible consequences of asymmetric information and
the need for information transmittal.  He notes that in many markets, it may be difficult or
impossible to distinguish good quality from bad.  In such markets, prices will reflect
average quality.  In this situation, there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality
goods.  Firms producing high quality goods will lose money because they will receive a
price reflecting the lower average of quality.  When these firms either reduce their quality
or leave the market, the average quality will further fall, and equilibrium will be
consistent only with poor quality ("lemons").
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Akerlof (1970) uses the automobile market as an example of his model.  He
begins with a discrete, two-quality-grade case.  He assumes that cars are new or used and
are of either good or bad quality.  After owning the car for a while, the owner can update
the probability that his/her car is a lemon.  This updated estimate is more accurate than
the original estimate.  Thus, sellers of used cars have better estimates concerning the
quality of used cars than do buyers.  Asymmetry in information concerning used cars
exists.  Good cars and bad cars will sell at the same price.  Not only can the owner of a
good car not receive the true value of his or her car, the owner cannot even obtain the
expected value of a used car.  Most cars traded will be lemons.  That is, the bad cars drive
out the good.  In the more continuous case of asymmetric information, Akerlof (1970)
demonstrates that it is possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the
medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good so that there is complete market
failure in which case no trading will take place.  Akerlof's "Lemons Principle" has led to
counteracting institutions including:  guarantees, brand-name goods, chains, licensing,
certification, and the granting of degrees.  These institutions can be viewed as methods of
signaling quality.
Spence (1973) details the conditions necessary for a signal to be effective.  Spence
finds that a potential signal may become an actual signal only if the signaling costs are
negatively correlated with the unknown characteristic of interest.  This is a necessary, but
not a sufficient condition.  It is also necessary that a sufficient number of signals be
available within the appropriate cost range.  Additionally, indices also have a potential
informational impact on the market.  Spence's (1973) conclusions concerning signaling
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imply that dividends have the potential to be signals of future firm cash flows, only if the
cost of issuing dividends decreases as cash flow prospects improve.
Spence (1974) develops a formal partial-equilibrium descriptive analysis of
market signaling under competition.  Spence's results imply that, over some range of cash
flows, the additional benefit to a firm of issuing one more dollar of dividends has to be
less than the marginal cost of issuing another dollar.  Otherwise, all firms would issue
dividends up to some hypothetical maximal limit and no information would be imparted
to the market.  Another implication is that in markets with asymmetric information
concerning cash flows prospects and dividends as a signal of the prospects, the properties
of equilibrium may be quite different than the properties that would be found in the
absence of signaling through dividends or if increasing dividends were costless.
Leland and Pyle (1977) provide the basis for asymmetric information among
managers and outside investors and the need for a method of signaling.  Moral hazard
prevents direct information transfer.  In other words, asymmetric information persists
because of agency costs.  Unable to distinguish among various projects with respect to
quality, investors assign average project quality to projects.  Then, market value reflects
average project quality.  If the supply of poor projects is large relative to the supply of
good projects, low average project quality will cause the cost of capital to be high.  Then
projects which are known to be good (by the entrepreneur) cannot be undertaken. This
result is reminiscent of Akerlof's (1970) "Lemons Principle."
Models of the signaling hypothesis with external signaling cost have been
developed by Bhattacharya (1979), Eades (1982), John and Williams (1985), Miller and
20
Rock (1985), Kale and Noe (1990) and Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998).  All six papers
exhibit consistency with Spence (1973) and predict that dividend announcements provide
investors with information about cash flows.  Additionally, Bhattacharya (1980) has
developed a dividend signaling model that does not rely on dissipative signaling costs.
Bhattacharya (1979) relies on asymmetric information.  If dividends are taxed at a
higher rate than capital gains, taxes operate as a cost of using dividends as a signal of true
cash flow.  Additionally, if there is a shortfall of cash flow (D - X) where D is the
committed dividend level and X is the level of cash flows, there are costs to current
shareholders due to the costs of raising unanticipated financing.  If outside investors are
unable to determine the productivity of assets across different firms, the market will make
inferences from changes in the firm's dividend policy.  Firms with sufficient cash flow
will increase their dividend payouts.  This action can be imitated by lesser firms only at a
prohibitive cost.  In equilibrium, firms will signal their true positions and investors will
correctly draw inferences from their signals.  Thus, cash dividends may be used as a
mechanism to signal investors.  Bhattacharya shows that signaling equilibria are feasible,
even if the signaling costs that are negatively related to expected cash flows are small, if
there are other signaling costs not related to cash flows. 
Bhattacharya (1980) uses an environment in which there are no exogenous costs
associated with communicating ex post earnings.  This means that accounting reports are
free of moral hazard.  Additionally, dividends and capital gains are taken to be taxed at
the same rate and shareholders are risk-neutral.  The models considered are intertemporal. 
In a three-time-point model, t = 0, 1, 2, the current generation of shareholders plans to sell
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out to a new generation at t = 1.  Bhattacharya shows that there is a market-based
adjustment of liquidation value at t = 1, based on the discrepancy between the ex ante (t =
0) signal and the actual cash flow at t = 1.  In the environment of the model, signaling
through dividends accelerates the timing of information transmittal from insiders to the
outside market about the firm's earnings prospects.
Eades (1982) presents a one-period dividend signaling model in which dividends
act as a signal of the riskiness of the firm’s end of period liquidation value.  The intuition
of the model is that if dividend signaling costs are a function of risk, then dividends will
also be a function of risk.  He uses a two-parameter (mean and variance) normal
distribution function for the firm’s end of period value.  The cost of the signal is the
moral hazard penalty assessed by the market on firms unable to make promised payments. 
A result of the model is that the level of dividends is a decreasing function of the variance
of the end of period liquidation value.  Indeed, his empirical results show that the firm’s
stock return volatility and dividend yield are negatively correlated.  However, he finds a
positive relationship between the information content of dividend changes and the firm’s
risk level.
In the model of Miller and Rock (1985), managers are assumed to have
information concerning the return on past investment (i.e., current earnings) not available
to outside investors.  Investors draw inferences about implied changes in expected net
operating cash flow from corporate dividend announcements.  Miller and Rock's results
also parallel Spence (1973).  The unobserved attribute is expected earnings, and the cost
of signaling is foregone productive investment.  This cost is inversely related to the actual
22
level of future earnings.  Corporate insiders signal with cash distributions and satisfy the
firm's sources and uses of funds constraint by altering investment.  Insiders in firms with
larger cash inflows can distribute more cash and still invest as much as firms with smaller
cash inflows.  If insiders in the less valuable firms try to match the cash payment levels of
the more valuable firms, they must invest less and forego projects with higher marginal
returns than the projects forgone by the more valuable firms.
Miller and Rock (1985) show dividend announcement effects to be a natural
outcome of the basic finance model of the firm's investment/financing/dividend decision. 
The strength of the price response to unexpected earnings varies directly with the degree
of persistence in the firm's underlying income stream.
Miller and Rock (1985) show that when both trading and asymmetric information
are incorporated into the investment/financing/dividend decision model, consistent
equilibrium leads in general to less than the Fisherian optimum levels of investment.  In
other words, profitable investment opportunities are wasted.  There is under investment. 
Additionally, the level of dividends is higher than under standard full information models. 
If the market assumes that the firm is following the Fisherian optimum investment
policy, there is a temptation to pay more dividends than the market expects in order to
increase the stock price.  As the deception becomes known to the market, price will
eventually fall back.  However, the potential gain to postannouncement sellers is greater
than the loss to nonselling shareholders.
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If outside investors take into account the temptation managers have to exploit
asymmetric information on behalf of the selling shareholders, their offer price will
discount the likely departure from the Fisherian optimum investment policy. 
Management, knowing that investors have allowed for this departure, will provide it. 
That is, no one is fooled.  The expectations of outside investors and management can be
fulfilled and time consistency can be restored.  However, efficiency has been lost.  The
departure from Fisherian optimum is directly related to (1) the weight of the market
determined current stock price (as opposed to the price insiders know to be deserved) in
the determination of social welfare, (2) the turnover parameter indicating the number of
shares sold upon dividend announcement, and (3) the degree of persistence in the firm's
underlying income stream.
Contractual provisions or legal restrictions that change both the information
asymmetry or the possibility of profiting from it can eliminate both inefficiency and time
inconsistency.  However, these provisions are likely to also carry a dead-weight loss.
Miller and Rock (1985) show that dividends and external financing are two sides
of the same coin.  They show that dividend announcement effects emerge naturally as
implications of the basic valuation model because investors draw inferences about the
firm's internal operating cash flows.  The firm's dividend announcements provide enough
pieces of the firm's sources and uses of funds statement for the market to deduce current
earnings.  That earnings figure serves as a basis for estimating future earnings.  Miller and
Rock suggest that positive dividend surprises are associated with larger-than-expected
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internally generated cash flows from operations.  Hence, dividend increases represent
good news for investors.
In the analysis of John and Williams (1985), funding for investment must come
from either the issuance of new shares or from retirement of fewer outstanding shares. 
Likewise, current stockholders must sell existing shares to raise cash.  In either case, the
ownership position of current shareholders is diluted by the sale of shares to meet
liquidity needs.  The higher tax rates on dividends relative to capital gains serves as the
signaling cost.  Insiders are assumed to have information not available to outside
investors concerning the firm's complete production technology.  With investment
assumed a constant, cash revealed by public audit, and the dollar amount of new
financing residually determined, the firms aggregate market price is a function only of its
dividend.  Insiders have incentive to reduce dilution through larger dividends and
accompanying higher stock prices whenever they possess favorable inside information. 
Outsiders recognize this relationship and bid up the price of stock when dividends are
distributed, thus reducing dilution.  For firms with more favorable inside information, the
premium paid for stocks with marginally larger dividends equals the incremental personal
taxes on the dividends.  Insiders are assumed to be unable to trade anonymously,
precluding a false signal.  The market contains a pricing mechanism which separates
firms with more favorable inside information from those with less.  Insiders control
dividends optimally, while outsiders pay the correct price for the firm's stock.
John and Williams (1985) find that the levels of dividends and stock prices are
higher for dividend declaring firms with more favorable inside information.  Insiders
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optimally smooth dividends relative to the stock's true value.  Signaling equilibrium does
not occur if there are no dissipative costs such as taxes associated with paying dividends. 
The marginal cost of signaling is the incremental personal taxes less the gain from
reduced dilution.  Consistent with Spence (1973), the marginal cost of signaling decreases
in the unobservable attribute being signaled.  That is, the marginal rate of substitution
between dividends and shareholder wealth decreases in the present value of future cash
flows.  In other words, the ratio of the marginal increase in personal taxes on dividends
and the lower dilution due to the stock price premium paid for a marginally larger
dividend is lower for firms having a higher present value of future cash flows.
In the two-period model of Kale and Noe (1990), dividend policy serves as a
signal of the stability of the firm’s future cash flows.  Stability is the reciprocal of total
risk (both systematic and unsystematic).  Firms are assumed to be all equity financed. 
The cost of signaling through higher dividends is the increased expected underwriting
costs from issuing equity.  The promise of higher dividends increases the probability that
the firm will have to issue equity and pay underwriting costs.  All firms have access to
projects which are identical in expected value of cash flows.  Firms differ only in the
uncertainty of future cash flows.  Dividend payments are announced one period ahead to
time.  If cash flows at the end of the first period are insufficient to meet the sum of
desired investment and previously announced dividends at the end of the first period, new
equity will be issued to make up the shortfall.  The dividend signaling benefit-to-cost
ratio ties dividend levels to the risk of cash flows.  Increases in cash flow risk increase the
risk of a cash shortfall, increasing the cost of signaling through dividends.  Hence,
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dividends are a credible signal.  Firms with less volatile future cash flows pay a higher
dividend.
Ravid and Sarig (1991) argue that debt and dividend policies are informationally
equivalent since both activities essentially commit the firm to make future periodic cash
outlays.  Then, dividend payments and leverage are characterized by Ravid and Sarig as
two technologies of information dissemination.  Together the policies form a
commitment package signaling the quality of the firm to outside investors.  The optimal
committing mix is selected such the marginal cost of committing with either policy is the
same.  In equilibrium, better firms pay higher dividends and are more highly leveraged
than lower quality firms.
In contrast to Ravid and Sarig (1991), Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998) provide a
signaling model in which higher quality firms issue new equity (decreasing leverage)
while offering cash dividends.  The model incorporates a “dividend related dead weight”
cost such as cost of outside financing and personal taxes.  The higher quality firm is
distinguished from lower quality firms by having a lower variance (but the same mean). 
Firms use debt and dividends to signal information about the variance of cash flow.
The Signaling Hypothesis--Empirical Evidence
The evidence supporting the signaling theory is mixed at best.  Watts (1973) was
among the first to empirically examine the information that dividends might provide
about future cash flows.  Watts uses regressions to study the significance of current and
past earnings and dividends upon future earnings.  Watts estimates regression coefficients
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of future earnings on current dividends.  Also, he regresses future earnings on unexpected
changes in dividends.  Watt’s regressions of future earnings on current dividends
indicates that the relationship is positive, but the t-statistics are very low.  Watt’s
regression of future earnings on unexpected changes in dividends indicates a positive but
weak relationship.  Next, Watts examines the relationship between the sign of the
unexpected change in current dividends and the sign of detrended future earnings
changes.  The sign test indicates dependence between unexpected change in future
earnings and unexpected change in dividends, however the average standardized
unexpected change in earnings associated with unexpected change in dividends is very
small.  Watts concludes that if there is any information in dividends, it is very small.
Healy and Palepu (1988) examine firm earnings performance for five years before
and five years after 131 dividend initiations and 172 dividend omissions.  They
standardize earnings with the stock price.  They find that there are significant and rapid
standardized earnings increases the year before and the year of the dividend initiation and
that standardized earnings continue to increase for two years following the initiation. 
Firms that omit dividends suffer an earnings decline in the year of the omission, but
recover during the subsequent several years.  Then, their results concerning initiations
support the dividend signaling hypothesis.  However, their results with omissions are the
opposite of what signaling theory would predict.
Wansley et al.  (1991) test the relationship between dividend announcement
effects and earnings stability.  Consistent with Eades (1982), Miller and Rock (1985),
Kale and Noe (1990), and Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998), dividend announcement
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effects are generally stronger when the firm’s earnings are more volatile.  It should be
noted that Wansley et al. only use quarterly earnings for the eight quarters before the
announcement.  This paper examines the relationship between the announcement effect
and the change in volatility of cash flows using cash flows from the eight quarters before
the announcement and the eight quarters after the announcement.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) study 145 NYSE firms that suffer an
earnings decline after at least nine consecutive years of earnings growth.  Of this sample,
99 firms (68.3%) increase dividends in the initial year of the earnings decline.  They
conclude that, “dividends are not pervasively useful signals of future earnings
performance.” Their results indicate the failure of dividends to be reliable signals is due
to (1) managerial overoptimism and (2) and the modest cash commitments associated
with the increase in dividends.
Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998) construct a sample of firms with four
years of flat cash flow that subsequently experience a sharp permanent cash flow jump. 
They find support for cash flow signaling in that these firms tend to boost their dividends
before their cash flow jumps.  Additionally, for the partition of these firms whose cash
flow remains at least 30% above year 0 levels for all four of the subsequent years, the
stock return outperforms the broad market by an average of 17.5% in year 0 and 29.3% in
year 1.  
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) examine whether dividend changes convey
information about preceding and subsequent earnings changes.  Signaling theory implies
that the sign of unexpected earnings in years 1 and 2 will be positively related to both the
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direction and magnitude of dividend changes in year 0.  Using categorical analysis, the
authors find that dividend-increasing firms show no obvious pattern of unexpected
earnings in years 1 and 2.  They find the perverse result that dividend-decreasing firms
have strongly positive unexpected earnings in year 1.  However, there is a strong positive
relationship between the sign of the dividend change and the sign of both concurrent
unexpected earnings changes and unexpected earnings changes in year -1.  Dividends
seem to be reacting to current and past earnings.  Thus, the authors conclude that the
predictive ability of changes in dividends is limited, except for dividend cuts which signal
an increase in future earnings.
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) also regress the changes in earnings in
years 0, 1, and 2 on several variables including dividend changes in year 0 to see whether
dividend changes add explanatory power.  While dividend changes help to explain
earnings changes in year 0, they provide little help in explaining earnings changes in years
1 and 2.  However, it should be noted that Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler do not control
for the investment opportunity set.  Rozeff (1982) and Smith and Watts (1992) provide
empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between growth options and
dividends.  Then, firms that are beginning to face limited growth options (mature firms)
will increase their payout ratio, to signal maturity and the return of cash rather than rising
earnings.
Consistent with Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, Penman and Sougiannis (1997)
find that increases in current dividends are followed by decreases in earnings. 
Additionally, Mozes and Rapaccioli (1998) find that earnings declines follow large
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1See Demsetz (1968), Garman (1976), Stoll (1978a), Amihud and Mendelson
(1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), and O'Hara and Oldfield 1986).
dividend increases.  The next two sections review the literature on the components of
dealer bid-ask spread and how the micromarkets may provide evidence on the signaling
and agency abatement theories.
Models of Market Maker Behavior and
Components of Bid-ask Spread
This section reviews literature on the determination of the bid-ask spread.  It
surveys research that indicates that analysis of bid-ask spreads can be used to investigate
the information content of events as well as research indicating which factors should be
controlled in event studies of this nature.
The bid-ask spread is set by a person who stands ready and waiting to trade (a
market maker).  In the case of the auction-market exchanges, the market makers are the
exchange specialists.  In the case of NASDAQ, dealers assume the role of the market
maker.  The theoretical work on the bid-ask spread asserts that a market maker sets the
spread to cover her/his costs, including compensation for risk-taking.  Two models
dominate the literature:  inventory control and adverse selection or asymmetric
information models.  Inventory control models focus on the use of spreads as portfolio
management tools for the market maker.1  According to inventory control models, the risk
 of the market maker is inventory risk.  Inventory levels are adjusted according to the
dealer's risk aversion by altering bid and ask prices.  Dealers lower (raise) prices when
inventory is considered to be too high (low).
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2See Bagehot (1971), Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
Kyle (1985), Easley and O’ Hara (1987), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), George, Kaul,
and Namalendran (1994), and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995).
Adverse selection models analyze dealer behavior in markets characterized by
asymmetric information.2  The models typically assume that market-maker inventory has
 no impact on prices.  These models focus an the adverse selection exposure of a dealer
who is unable to distinguish between informed and uninformed traders.  In these models,
the market-makers recoup losses suffered in trades with informed traders through gains in
trades with uninformed (liquidity) traders by widening the spread as informational
asymmetry increases.  Adverse selection models imply that corporate events which
decrease (increase) information asymmetry cause bid/ask spreads to become smaller
(larger).  Thus, adverse selection models are used to analyze the information revealed by
changes in the bid-ask spread.
Much of the empirical literature supports the view that information costs are a
substantial portion of the total spread.  Benston and Hagerman (1974) use firm-specific
risk as a proxy for adverse information and find a positive relationship between bid-ask
spread and firm-specific risk.  Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) use insider shareholdings as
a proxy for informational asymmetry and find that it is positively related to the percentage
bid-ask spread.  Glosten and Harris (1988) find that a significant portion of NYSE
spreads is due to asymmetric information.  Stoll (1989) estimates that informed trading
risk constitutes roughly 43 percent of the quoted spread for stocks trading on the
NASDAQ.  Madhavan and Smidt (1991) develop and test a Bayesian model of specialist
pricing behavior that incorporates both asymmetric information and inventory control
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effects.  They analyze transaction data and find no short-run price effect due to inventory
control.  They emphasis a specialist's role as an investor.  The specialist chooses a desired
long-term inventory level based on portfolio considerations.  They show that the
specialist's target inventory may shift over time in response to changes in the risk profile
of the stock.  They suggest that inventory holding costs are small and find strong support
for information asymmetry.  George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) also suggest that the
cost of holding inventory levels which differ from the desired level is relatively small. 
They estimate that the adverse selection component of spread at 8 to 13 percent of the
total spread.
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1994) provide theoretical analysis indicating that
the willingness of informed traders to trade aggressively on their private information
increases as informational asymmetry increases.  The specialist responds by widening the
bid-ask spread for each level of net order flow.  This decreases the willingness of all
agents (both liquidity traders and informed traders) to trade.
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995) provide a model indicating that market makers
have more information than liquidity traders, but still must face adverse selection. 
Market makers tend to have more information than "outside investors" because the
former monitors the market continuously.  However, some outside investors (termed
"discretionary outsiders") can time when they will enter the market.  The discretionary
outsiders tend to enter the market at times that allow them to offset the order flow.
Manaster and Mann (1996) find evidence that neither the inventory control or
adverse selection models accurately describe market maker behavior.  Using information
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from Chicago Mercantile Exchange futures, they find that dealers tend to become net
sellers whenever they hold positive inventory, as predicted by inventory control models. 
However, they tend to sell at higher prices, in contradiction to traditional inventory
control models.  They infer that market makers are active profit-seeking agents with
differing levels of information and/or trading skill.
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) use an approach similar to the
Glosten and Harris (1988) model to estimate spread components for NYSE stocks.  They
estimate that the adverse selection component comprises approximately 43 percent of the
spread.
Although adverse selection models imply that corporate events which decrease
(increase) information asymmetry cause bid/ask spreads to become smaller (larger), the
effect is not likely to be immediate.  Dealers may react defensively on days that there are
large price changes, no matter what the informational event.  Morse and Ushman (1983)
find an increase in absolute dollar spread on days of large price changes.  These increases
occurred on days of large increases as well as decreases in price.
Bid-ask Spread and Dividend Policy 
Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) find information asymmetry increases before
earnings or dividend announcements that follow other earnings or dividend
announcements by between 10 and 30 days inclusive.  They did not find significant
increases in preannouncement asymmetry otherwise.  Because their work deals with
preannouncement bid-ask spread rather than reaction to dividend increase
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announcements, it does not specifically address dividend policy.   Howe and Lin (1992)
argue that if dividend payments reduce the costs stemming from separation of ownership
and control by providing additional information to investors about the actions and
intentions of management, the information will also be available to market makers. 
Howe and Lin (1992) find that there is an inverse relationship between dividend yield and
bid-ask spreads after controlling for other determinants of the spread (price level, trading
volume, return variance and the number of market makers).  However, these findings are
consistent with both the signaling hypothesis and the agency abatement hypothesis.
Using a sample of 90 NYSE firms, Brooks (1994) measures the total bid-ask
spread as well as the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread around dividend
increases that occur in 1988.  He finds that both the total spread and the adverse selection
component around the announcement period is not significantly different from the
nonevent period.  The sample is not partitioned in a way that allows investigation of
either the signaling or agency abatement hypotheses.
 Mitra and Rashid (1997) examine dividend initiations and find that the mean
percentage spread significantly narrows on announcement day and remains lower, on
average, over the next year.  As with Howe and Lin (1992), Mitra and Rashid’s findings
are consistent with both the signaling hypothesis and the agency abatement hypothesis.
Chapter Summary
A positive stock price reaction to dividend increases has been well documented in
the literature.  Both cash flow signaling and agency abatement remain plausible
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explanations.  There is a need to determine which hypothesis best succeeds in explaining
the phenomenon.  Additionally, the bid-ask spread response to dividend increases remains
relatively unexplored.  Prior to this study, the cash flow signaling and agency abatement




This chapter presents the research hypotheses that were tested.  It details the
sample selection procedure.  The variables and event study procedures used are described
in detail.  Also outlined are the statistical analyses that were used to test the research
hypotheses.  The chapter is divided into five sections.  These sections are research
hypotheses, sample selection, variable definitions, estimated generalized least squares
modeling of CPEs, CHGSPDs, and CMASs, and chapter summary.  The research
hypothesis section provides hypotheses for short-term price effects from dividend
increases, long-term price effects from dividend increases, and spread effects from
dividend increases.  Data sources for each variable are included with the variable
definitions.
Research Hypotheses
The research question advanced in Chapter One is answered by testing the
hypotheses presented in this section.  First, a brief review of the theories from which the
hypotheses are drawn is given.
Agency theory predicts that firms will be prone to become overinvestors (Jensen
1986).  Investments may be made to assure survival through diversification of the
earnings stream and thereby reduce managers' compensation risk.  Additionally, projects
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may be undertaken to improve career opportunities and status rather than maximizing
firm value.  
Agency theory suggest that dividends constrict management actions through
improved monitoring (Easterbrook 1984), disclosure of information (Rozeff 1982), and
by reducing free cash flow (Lang and Litzenberger 1989). Through the dividend decision,
firms can designate cash flows to shareholders facing superior investment opportunities
rather than to negative net present value ventures.  The agency abatement theory of
dividends is illustrated in Figure 1.
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) show that Tobin's Q ratio is an indicator of firms 
that overinvest in this manner.  Thus, agency theory suggests that firms that possess high 
levels of owner/manager agency risk will exhibit a low Q.  Managers wishing to create 
shareholder wealth are likely to use dividend increases as a method to temper the agency
risk for owners.  Conversely, those firms with high Q are unlikely to pose significant 
agency risk to shareholders.  Managers of these firms are unlikely to make dividend
decisions on the basis of agency mitigation.
Signaling models developed by Pettit (1972), Bhattacharya (1979), John and
Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) suggest that dividend increases signal
information about the level of future cash flows.   Ofer and Siegel (1987) find analysts
revise their earnings forecast based upon the size of unexpected dividend changes. This
version of dividend signaling theory is illustrated in Figure 2 Panel A.
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Figure 1.  Agency Abatement Theory: Dividend Increase Constricts Management’s
Behavior, Reducing the Shareholder/Manager Agency Problem.
Shareholders’ Objective (Maximization of Shareholder Wealth) and Some of the
Actions of Management are in Conflict before the Dividend Increase.

















Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998) provide models in
which dividend increases signal stability of cash flows.  This version of dividend
signaling theory is illustrated in Figure 2 Panel B.
Tables 1 and 2 partition the agency abatement and cash flow signaling motives to
increase dividends.  In the spirit of Pettit (1972), Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams 
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Table 1--Dividend Increase Motivation Table with Signaling-motivated
Dividend Increases Characterized by a Subsequent
Increase in the Mean Cash Flow
Agency-motivated dividend increases, as illustrated in Figure 1, are characterized by
low Tobin’s Q.  Signaling-motivated dividend increases are characterized by a high
subsequent change in cash flow as in Panel A of Figure 2.  Partitions of firm/events in
Cells 1 and 4 are used to test hypotheses HS1, HL1, HM1, and HI1 as explained later
in the chapter.  Agency abatement theory is supported if Cell 1 response is greater than
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(1985), and Miller and Rock (1985), Table 1 uses change in cash flow to partition firms
into those with either low or high signaling motivation.   Firms with Tobin’s Q less than
or equal to the sample median are classified as low Tobin’s Q firms and are placed in the
left column; otherwise, firms are designated as high Tobin’s Q firms and are placed in the
right column.  Firms with a negative change in cash flow are considered low change in
cash flow firms and are placed in the top row; otherwise, firms are designated as high
change in cash flow firms and are placed in the bottom row.  Within Table 1, firms in
Cell 1 are labeled AGENCY1 and firms in Cell 4 are labeled SIGNAL1.
Firms in Cell 1 are considered to be those whose dividend decision is motivated
by the owner/manager agency problem but not by cash flow signaling.  These are over-
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investing firms which currently are investing in projects with negative net present value.
That is, they are investing in projects with rates of return below their cost of capital. 
These firm's will have low Q ratios.  Firms in Cell 4 are believed to be motivated by cash
flow signaling and not by agency abatement.  They have cash flows that are rising and are
at low risk for shareholder/management agency conflict.  The motivation for firms in Cell
2 is indeterminate within the context of informational signaling and agency costs.  Firms
in Cell 3 are likely to be motivated by either cash flow signaling or agency abatement or
both.  Since this paper focuses on the relative importance of agency abatement and cash
flow signaling, interest centers on firms in Cells 1 and 4.
In the spirit of Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990) and Brick, Frierman, and Kim
(1998), Table 2 uses change in coefficient of variation of cash flow to separate firms into
those with low or high signaling motivation.  Firms exhibiting a positive change in
coefficient of variation of cash flows are considered to be high change in  coefficient of
variation of cash flows firms.  These firms are not motivated to signal improved cash
flows due to the deterioration of the cash flow distribution and are placed in row 1;
otherwise firms are placed in row 2.  Firms in Cell 4 are believed to be motivated by cash
flow signaling and not by agency abatement.  They are at low risk for
shareholder/management agency conflict and are experiencing reduced volatility of cash
flows.  As with Table 1, firms in Cell 1 are considered to be those whose dividend
decision is motivated by the owner/manager agency problem but not by cash flow
signaling.  Within Table 2, firms in Cell 1 are labeled AGENCY2 and firms in Cell 4 are
labeled SIGNAL2.  Again, the focus is on Cells 1 and 4.
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Table 2--Dividend Increase Motivation Table with Signaling-motivated
Dividend Increases Characterized by a Subsequent Decrease
in the Variability of Cash Flows
Agency-motivated dividend increases, as illustrated in Figure 1, are characterized by
low Tobin’s Q.  Signaling-motivated dividend increases are characterized by a low
subsequent change in the coefficient of variation of cash flow as in Panel B of Figure 2. 
Partitions of firm/events in Cells 1 and 4 are used to test hypotheses HS2, HL2, HM2,
and HI2 as explained later in the chapter.  Agency abatement theory is supported if Cell
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Hereafter, the collective structure of Tables 1 and 2 is referred to as the
“motivation table.”  This structure is used  to map the hypotheses presented in this
chapter, the results are presented and discussed in Chapter 4.
Hypotheses drawn from agency theory and cash flow signaling theory are
presented below.  These hypotheses aid in identifying specific contexts in which dividend
decisions should be value-enhancing, value-destroying, or value-neutral as well as spread
decreasing or increasing.  The hypotheses system for identifying hypotheses may be
summarized as follows: the letter “S” in the second position indicates the use of a (days
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1, 0) window for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), the letter “L” indicates the use
of a (days 1, 504) window for CARs, a “M” indicates that the use of a (days 1, 0)
window for controlled mean abnormal spreads, and an “I” indicates the use of a change in
spread (CHGSPD) as measured by the ratio of mean relative spread from day 40 to day 20
(a 21 day period) over mean relative spread from day -20 to day -40.  Each set of
hypotheses consists of a null and an alternative.  In each case the null is labeled with an
“0” subscript and the alternative is labeled with an “A”.
Hypotheses Involving Short-term Stock Price Response
The first set of hypotheses represents the possibility that initial stock price
reaction to the announcement of dividend increases differs between firms with a strong
need to abate the shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation to signal
a change in the level of cash flows and firms without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem but with a motivation to signal a rise in the level of
cash flows.  This set of hypotheses and the following one are tested using estimated
generalized least squares regressions modeling the (days 1, 0) CPE.
HS10: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is not a difference between the initial stock price reaction to
sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without motivation to
signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
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rising cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).
HS1A: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is a difference between the initial stock price reaction to
sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without motivation to
signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
rising cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem.
The next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that initial stock price
reaction to the announcement of dividend increases differs between firms with a strong
need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation to
signal a change in the stability of cash flows and firms without a strong need to mitigate
the shareholder/manager agency problem but with a motivation to signal reduced
volatility of cash flows.
HS20: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is not a difference between the initial stock price reaction to
sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without motivation to
signal relatively more stable cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate
the shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 2, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).
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HS2A: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is a significant difference between the initial stock price
reaction to sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without
motivation to signal relatively more stable cash flows but with a strong need
to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation
to signal relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem.
Hypotheses Involving Long-term Stock Price Response
Hypotheses concerning stock-price reaction to large dividend increases over a
longer time period are also tested.  Fama (1998) states that there is “developing literature .
. . arguing . . . that stock prices adjust slowly to information.”  In response to those
arguments, the next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that long-term stock drift
following the announcement of dividend increases differs between firms with a strong
need to abate the shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation to signal
a change in the level of cash flows and firms without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem but with a motivation to signal a rise in the level of
cash flows.  This set of hypotheses and the following one are tested using estimated
generalized least squares regressions modeling the (days 1, 504) CPE.
HL10: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is not a difference between the long-term stock price drift
following sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without
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motivation to signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
rising cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).
HL1A: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is a difference between the long-term stock price drift
following sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without
motivation to signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
rising cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem
The next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that long-term stock price
drift following the announcement of dividend increases differs between firms with a
strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation
to signal a change in the stability of cash flows and firms without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem but with a motivation to signal reduced
volatility of cash flows.
HL20: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is not a significant difference between the long-term stock
price drift following sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1)
without motivation to signal relatively more stable cash flows but with a
strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with
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a motivation to signal relatively more stable future cash flows but without a
strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 2,
Cell 1 versus Cell 4).
HL2A: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, and free-
cash flow, there is a significant difference between the long-term stock price
drift following sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without
motivation to signal relatively more stable cash flows but with a strong need
to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation
to signal relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem.
Hypotheses Involving Short-term Bid-Ask Spread Response
The next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that initial bid-ask percentage
spread response to the announcement of dividend increases differs between firms with a
strong need to abate the shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation to
signal a change in the level of cash flows and firms without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem but with a motivation to signal a rise in the level of
cash flows.  This set of hypotheses and the following one are tested using estimated
generalized least squares regressions modeling the (days 1, 0) CMAS.
HM10: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, free-
cash flow, change in trading volume, change in return variance, and
change in closing price, there is not a difference between the initial bid-
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ask spread response to sampled dividend increase announcements of
firms (1) without motivation to signal rising cash flows but with a strong
need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a
motivation to signal rising cash flows but without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 1, Cell 1
versus Cell 4).
HM1A: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, free-cash
flow, change in trading volume, change in return variance, and change in
closing price, there is a difference between the initial bid-ask spread response
to sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without motivation
to signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
rising cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem.
The next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that initial bid-ask percentage
spread response to the announcement of dividend increases differs between firms with a
strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation
to signal a change in the stability of cash flows and firms without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem but with a motivation to signal reduced
volatility of cash flows.
HM20: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, free-
cash flow, change in trading volume, change in return variance, and
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change in closing price, there is not a significant difference between the
initial bid-ask spread response to sampled dividend increase
announcements of firms (1) without motivation to signal relatively more
stable cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 2, Cell 1
versus Cell 4).
HM2A: There is a significant difference between the initial bid-ask spread response to
sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without motivation to
signal relatively more stable cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem.
Hypotheses Involving Intermediate-term Bid-Ask Spread Response
Because spreads may increase during time periods surrounding any informational
event (see Morse and Ushman 1983), micromarket structure response is also tested over
an intermediate length time period that excludes a short-period around the actual dividend
increase announcement.  The next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that bid-ask
percentage spread response to the announcement of dividend increases over an
intermediate period of time differs between firms with a strong need to abate the
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shareholder/manager agency problem but without a motivation to signal a change in the
level of cash flows and firms without a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager
agency problem but with a motivation to signal a rise in the level of cash flows.  This set
of hypotheses and the following one are tested using estimated generalized least squares
regressions modeling the change in relative spread (CHGSPD) which is described in
more detail in the variable definitions section of this chapter.
HI10: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, free-
cash flow, change in trading volume, change in return variance, and
change in closing price, there is not a difference between the
intermediate-term bid-ask spread response to sampled dividend increase
announcements of firms (1) without motivation to signal rising cash
flows but with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency
problem and (2) with a motivation to signal rising cash flows but without
a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem
(Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).
HI1A: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, free-cash
flow, change in trading volume, change in return variance, and change in
closing price, there is a difference between the initial bid-ask spread response
to sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without motivation
to signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
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rising cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem.
The next set of hypotheses represents the possibility that the intermediate-term
bid-ask percentage spread response to the announcement of dividend increases differs
between firms with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem
but without a motivation to signal a change in the stability of cash flows and firms
without a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem but with a
motivation to signal reduced volatility of cash flows.
HI20: Controlling for dividend yield, price-standardized dividend change, free-
cash flow, change in trading volume, change in return variance, and
change in closing price, there is not a significant difference between the
intermediate-term bid-ask spread response to sampled dividend increase
announcements of firms (1) without motivation to signal relatively more
stable cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to signal
relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem (Table 2, Cell 1
versus Cell 4).
HI2A: There is a significant difference between the intermediate-term bid-ask spread
response to sampled dividend increase announcements of firms (1) without
motivation to signal relatively more stable cash flows but with a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and (2) with a motivation to
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3Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1998, Section C, p. 15.
signal relatively more stable future cash flows but without a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem.
Sample Selection
Firms were included or excluded from the sample based upon the following
criteria:
 1. Returns on securities identified by CRSP as other than ordinary common shares
(CRSP share codes 10 and 11) were excluded.
 2. The dividend increase must have been declared in 1995.
 3. The current dividend and the four prior dividends must be quarterly dividends
(code No. 1232 on the CRSP tape).
 4. Only cash dividend increases with a magnitude of at least ten percent were
included in the sample.  A dividend change is defined, for purposes of inclusion,
as the difference between quarter t dividend and quarter t  1 dividend.  The
dividend in the quarter prior to the dividend change must have been at least $0.10. 
Obviously, the sample excludes dividend initiations.
 5. Daily rates of return must have been available on the CRSP tapes.
 6. Declaration dates of quarterly dividend payments must be available from CRSP
tapes.
 7. In order to reduce the effects of noise and to ensure that the sample consists of
“real operating companies”, the sample was limited to firms with a stock price of
$6 two days prior to the declaration date.  The SEC defines penny stocks as those
issued by thinly capitalized companies which are trading under $5.3  Further, the
 cash dividend must not be a completely liquidating dividend.
 8. Firms with SIC codes beginning with 67** were excluded.  This excludes
investment companies, certain trusts, and bank holding companies.  The agency
problem is expected to be less for these firms due to either their ownership
structure or regulation.
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 9. Class B, C, etc. stock was excluded when identified as such.  The role of
dividends in reducing the agency problem across various classes of stock is
uncertain.  Additionally, often the payouts across the different classes move in
lockstep, resulting in duplication of information.
10. Cash dividends per share and stock prices must be available from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape for the period 1993-1997 in order to be
included.
11. Limited partnerships and firms labeled as ADR's, ADS's, American Shares, or
ODR's were excluded.
12. Firms with Wall Street Journal earnings announcements on event days 3, 2, 1,
0, and 1 (where day 1 is the declaration date) were omitted.
13. Some firms were eliminated (somewhat arbitrarily) because of major news during
the event window.  Examples of news that would result in elimination are rebuff
of a takeover attempt, stock split or stock dividend announcements, stock
repurchases, and announcement of charges against earnings.
14. There must be sufficient information available on Compustat PC Plus to calculate
the independent variables used to explain event abnormal returns.  This
information may be on either the active or research data base.  The research data
base was used to reduce survivorship bias.
The sample was obtained in the following manner:  there were a 258 dividend
increase events that met the dividend and stock price requirements and with adequate
daily return availability on the CRSP tapes.  Of those, 82 events were dropped due to
confounding events around the announcement date.  Another 81 firms were eliminated
due to lack of information on Compustat needed to calculate independent variables.  The
final sample size of events resulting from these screens was 95.  These 95 events are
distributed within the cells of Table 1 as follows: 14 in Cell 1, 11 in Cell 2, 33 in Cell 3,
and 37 in Cell 4.  The distribution within the cells of Table 2 are as follows: 20 in Cell 1,
17 in Cell 2, 27 in Cell 3, and 31 in Cell 4.
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Additionally, a matched control portfolio of firms that did not increase their
dividend by 10% or more during 1995 was formed.   Each firm in the large dividend
increase sample was matched with a control firm on (1) four digit Standard and Poors
SIC code and (2) 1994 total assets.  Matched firms were determined by examining all
firms with the same SIC code, excluding firms whenever there were not enough daily
returns for a (days 1, 504) event study window, and finally selecting the firm with
closest total assets to the firm in the dividend increase sample.  If there were not a close
SIC match, firms were matched from the “key competitors” list of Hoover’s Online
(www.hoovers.com).  Only seven dividend increase firms were not matched with control
firms at the four digit SIC level.   Of these seven, four match at the two digit SIC level. 
Three matching firms were selected from the competitors list of Hoover’s Online.  This
process resulted in 93 matched pairs.  The dividend increase and control firms are listed
in Table 3.  Table 4 shows the size distribution of the dividend increase and matching
samples.  The table shows that the size (book value of assets) distribution of the matching
firms is smaller than their large dividend increase counterparts.
Variable Definitions
Variable definitions and data sources are described in this section.
Tobin's Q Ratio (Q)
Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) is used as a proxy of a firm’s agency cost of equity.  Tobin
and Brainard (1968) and Tobin (1969) defined Q as the ratio of a firm's market value to
the replacement of cost assets.  As previously stated, firms that possess high levels of
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agency risk should exhibit a low Q (see Lang and Litzenberger 1989).  The replacement
cost of assets proxies for the alternative-use value of assets.  Firm’s that use their assets to 
create high market values relative to the cost of replacing them are deemed to be using 

































PROCESSING 5/19/95 7374 FISERV INC 7374
AVON PRODUCTS 8/2/95 2844
CARTER-WALLACE
INC 2844
BADGER METER INC 5/19/95 3824
MARCUM NATURAL
GAS SVCS INC 3824
BANDAG INC 11/14/95 3011 TREADCO INC 5010
BANTA CORP 12/5/95 2750 BOWNE & CO INC 2750
BECKMAN COULTER
INC 2/3/95 3826 PERKIN-ELMER CORP 3826
BECTON DICKINSON
& CO 11/28/95 3841 U S SURGICAL CORP 3841




INC 2/14/95 3651 KOSS CORP 3651
CABOT CORP 7/14/95 2890 NALCO CHEMICAL CO 2890
CARLISLE COS INC 8/2/95 3714 WALBRO CORP 3714
CENTRAL
NEWSPAPERS  -CL A 9/12/95 2711 LEE ENTERPRISES 2711




CHRYSLER CORP 5/18/95 3711
NAVISTAR
INTERNATIONAL 3711
CHRYSLER CORP 12/7/95 3711
NAVISTAR
INTERNATIONAL 3711
CLOROX CO/DE 7/18/95 2842
SPECIALTY CHEM
RES 2842












COCA-COLA CO 2/16/95 2080
TRIARC COS INC 
-CL A 2080








PRODUCTS CORP 4/3/95 2835 IDEXX LABS INC 2835
DOW CHEMICAL 5/11/95 2821 GEON COMPANY 2821
EATON CORP 4/26/95 3600
WATERS INSTRUMENT
INC 3612
ECOLAB INC 12/18/95 2840
SYBRON CHEMICALS
INC 2840
EDWARDS (A G) INC 11/17/95 6211 ADVEST GROUP INC 6211
SCRIPPS E W CO
(CLASS A) 5/1/95 2711 Not  matched
FINOVA GROUP INC 8/10/95 6153
ARCADIA FINANCIAL
LTD (OLYMPIC) 6153
FIRST BRANDS CORP 10/27/95 3081 SEALED AIR CORP 3081
FRANKLIN
RESOURCES INC 12/11/95 6282 EQUITABLE COS INC 6282
FULLER (H. B.) CO 4/20/95 2891 PACER TECHNOLOGY 2891
GALLAGHER (ARTHUR
J.) & CO 1/23/95 6411
BLANCH E W HLDGS
INC 6411
GENERAL ELECTRIC
CO 12/15/95 3600 MAGNETEK INC 3612
GENERAL MOTORS
CORP 5/1/95 3711 FORD MOTOR CO 3711
GEORGIA-
PACIFIC GROUP 5/2/95 2600 MERCER INTL INC 2600
GILLETTE CO 2/16/95 3420 STANLEY WORKS 3420
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GOODYEAR TIRE &






















CORP 11/29/95 4011 ST JOE CO 4011
ILLINOIS TOOL
WORKS 8/4/95 3560 INGERSOLL-RAND CO 3560
INTERPUBLIC GROUP




FINANCIAL CORP 3/9/95 6321 CONSECO INC 6321
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 4/27/95 2834 LILLY (ELI) & CO 2834
KELLY SERVICES
INC  -CL A 5/17/95 7363
COASTAL PHYSICIAN
GROUP INC 7363









LIQUI-BOX CORP 9/15/95 3089 QUIXOTE CORP 3089
LOUISIANIA-
PACIFIC CORP 5/1/95 2421 POPE & TALBOT INC 2421
MODINE MFG CO 5/17/95 3714
STANDARD PRODUCTS
CO 3714




CORP 9/11/95 6331 NAC RE CORP 6331
OXFORD INDUSTRIES
INC 1/9/95 2320 HAGGAR CORP 2320
PENNEY (JC) CO 3/8/95 5311
MAY DEPARTMENT
STORES CO 5311





INTERNATIONAL 6/13/95 100 MYCOGEN CORP 100
PITNEY BOWES INC 2/13/95 3579 KRONOS INC 3579
PRICE (T. ROWE)
ASSOCIATES 12/13/95 6282 PIONEER GROUP INC 6282



































ROHM & HAAS CO 7/24/95 2821
BORDEN CHEM&PLAST
-LP COM 2821
RUBBERMAID INC 10/24/95 3089 SYNETIC INC 3089
SHERWIN-
WILLIAMS CO 2/15/95 2851
PPG INDUSTRIES
INC 2851




INDUSTRIES  -CL A 8/17/95 2211 CONE MILLS CORP 2211




SYSCO CORP 11/3/95 5140 SUPERVALU INC 5140
TANDY CORP 12/18/95 5731
CIRCUIT CITY STR
CRCT CTY GP 5731
TCA CABLE TV INC 12/14/95 4841
JONES INTERCABLE
INC  -CL A 4841
TELEFLEX INC 4/28/95 3841 STRYKER CORP 3841
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 8/4/95 2631 MEAD CORP 2631
59
TENNECO INC 12/5/95 3714 Not matched
TEXTRON INC  2/22/95 3720 BOEING CO 3721
TIMKEN CO 11/3/95 3562
WOLVERINE TUBE
INC 3350
TRW INC 10/25/95 3714 DANA CORP 3714












UST INC  12/14/95 2100 BROOKE GROUP LTD 2111
VALSPAR CORP 12/13/95 2851 RENTECH INC 2851
VULCAN MATERIALS
CO 2/16/95 1400 CALMAT CO 1400
WALLACE COMPUTER
SVCS INC 9/7/95 2761
STANDARD REGISTER
CO 2761
WEIS MARKETS INC 7/12/95 5411
HANNAFORD
BROTHERS CO 5411
WHIRLPOOL CORP 2/21/95 3630 MAYTAG CORP 3630
WILLAMETTE
INDUSTRIES 2/9/95 2621 BOWATER INC 2621






INTERNATIONAL INC 2/16/95 3050 FURON CO 3050
ZERO CORP/DE 1/26/95 3460
SHILOH INDUSTRIES
INC 3460
these scarce resources in a manner than maximizes shareholder wealth.  Those firms with
low time specific Q’s are judged to be using resources poorly from the perspective of
shareholders.  That is, firms with low relative Q’s are the type of firm that Lang and
Litzenberger label as overinvestors. Tobin’s Q is unobservable and can only be 
estimated.  Here, Tobin's Q was estimated using the methodology proposed by Lewellen
and  Badrinath (1997) as modified by Lee and Tompkins (1999).  Specifically,
                                        (1)Q
MVE  MPS  MDEBT
BTA  BI  BFA  BODEBT  RCI  RCFA
,
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where MVE is the market value of the firm’s equity (end-of-year common share price 
Table 4–1994 Book Value of Total Assets for Sample of Large Dividend Increases
and Associated Matching Firms
1994 Book Value of Total Assets in Millions of Dollars












times number of outstanding shares), MPS is the annual required preferred dividend 
divided by the prevailing Standard and Poor’s preferred stock yield, MDEBT is the book
value of the firm’s short-term debt plus the estimated market value of long-term debt,
BTA is the book value of total assets, BI is the book value of inventories, BFA is the
book value of fixed assets, BODEBT is the book value of spontaneously generated non-
interest bearing liabilities, RCI is the estimated replacement cost of inventories, RCFA is
the estimated replacement cost of fixed assets.  The market value of long-term debt, RCI,
and RCFA were estimated using the Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) algorithms.  All
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components for the calculation were obtained from COMPUSTAT PC PLUS.  All
components were for the calendar year prior to the dividend declaration.  TOBINQ was
used to distinguish high agency firms from other firms in the sample.  TOBINQ was
calculated for the end of calendar 1994.
Free Cash Flow (FCF)
As previously stated, firms that have high levels of free cash flow are often
proposed to be firms with high levels of agency risk.  Following Lang, Stulz, and
Walking (1991), free cash flow was estimated as operating income before depreciation
minus taxes, interest expense, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all divided by
the book value of total assets.  Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) present a theoretical
argument against scaling by market value of equity.  FCF was computed for the calendar
1994 (the year prior to the declaration date).  All inputs for the calculation were obtained
from COMPUSTAT PC PLUS.  The measure of free cash flow defined from
COMPUSTAT data items is




Change in Cash Flow (CHGCF)
The change from ex ante mean quarterly operating cash flows to ex post mean
operating cash flow was used to measure cash flow variability.  Quarterly operating cash
flows for the eight quarters prior to the declaration was used to calculate the ex ante mean
quarterly operating cash flow.  Similarly, quarterly operating cash flows for the eight
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quarters following the declaration was used to calculate the ex post mean quarterly
operating cash flow.  The difference between the ex post mean quarterly operating cash
flow and ex ante mean quarterly operating cash flow was scaled by total assets.  Because
rising mean cash flow should be consistent with dividend increases according to the
signaling hypothesis, CHGCF is used as a proxy of signaling motivation.  Operating cash
flows are defined as net cash flows from operating activities plus interest.  This definition
is selected because in reflects the firm's day-to-day activities of producing and selling. 
Interest is added back because it is a financing expense.  Additionally, it thought that
there is less informational asymmetry concerning future interest expense than other
components of operating cash flow as defined by FASB 95.  The measure of cash flow
defined from COMPUSTAT data items is




Change in Cash Flow Variability (CHGCFVAR)
The need for firms to signal cash flow is nonobservable and requires a proxy. 
Theory suggests that firms with rising and/or stable future cash flows have the highest
need to signal that information to shareholders through dividend increases.  Cash flow
variability is used as a measure of cash flow quality and was used as a proxy for signaling
motivation.  Indeed, Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), and Brick, Frierman, and Kim
(1998) have developed signaling models in which firms with less volatile future cash
flows pay higher dividends.  The higher the cash flow variability, the lower the quality. 
The percentage change from ex ante coefficient of variation of operating cash flows to ex
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post coefficient of variation of operating cash flow was be used to measure improved
cash flow variability.  Quarterly operating cash flows for the eight quarters preceding
(following) the declaration were used to calculate the ex ante (ex post) coefficient of
variation.  Falling coefficients of variation should be consistent with dividend increases
according to the signaling hypothesis.
Price Standardized Dividend Change (DIVCHG)
As in Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994), price-standardized dividend change is
calculated as the change in dividend divided by the share price two days prior to the
dividend declaration:




where Di, t is the quarter t dividend, Di, t  1 is the quarterly dividend just prior to the
dividend change, and Pi, n  1 is the stock price two days prior to the dividend declaration. 
The information was calculated from information on the CRSP files.
Dividend Yield (DIVYLD)
Dividend yield is defined as the sum of dividends paid during the four quarters
prior to the dividend declaration divided by the closing price two days before the
declaration date:









DIVYLD was calculated from information on the CRSP files.  DIVYLD is included to
control for possible clientele effects.  If there are heterogeneous marginal valuations of
dividends, the stock price reaction to dividend increases will be stronger for high yield
stocks.  Bajaj and Vijh (1990) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994) find that announcement
period excess returns are significantly and positively related to yield.
Mean (Days 1, 0) Cumulative Prediction Error (CPE)
Using Eventus software, and following Mikkelson and Partch (1988) and others,
an ordinary least squares of the following form was used to estimate the market model
parameters used in estimating firm CPEs (often called abnormal return), 
                                                                                               (6)Rjt  j  j Rmt  jt ,
where Rjt is the rate of return of the jth security in time period t, Rmt is the investment
relative of the market, and jt is the random error term incorporating unique risk.  The
prediction error is defined as
                                                                                             (7)̂jt  Rjt  (̂j  ̂j Rmt).
The cumulative prediction error is measured as 







In obtaining parameter estimates from the market model, an estimation period of
400 days (with minimum estimation period of 200 days) was used.  The last day of the
estimation period is thirty days before the event date.  Both the CRSP value weighted
market index and the CPSP equally weighted index were used in separate market
parameter estimations.  The event date (day 1) is defined as the actual declaration date
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from the CRSP files.  The day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal
announcement date.
The reported Z statistic for cumulative prediction errors is that described by Patell
(1976).   The Mikkelson and Partch (1988) correction for serial dependence of cumulative
prediction errors was used.
Mean (Days 1, 504) Cumulative Prediction Errors
In the spirit of Karafiath, Mynatt, and Smith (1991), a matched portfolio was
formed from two portfolios:
1. the ‘large dividend increase’ portfolio comprised of the sampled firm/events
previously described of dividend increases of 10% or more in 1995.  However,
two firms from the complete dividend increase sample did not have enough
available returns to estimate a (days 1, 504) window.  This process resulted in a
sample 93 dividend increases greater than 10 percent.
2. the matched control portfolio of 93 firms previously described.
The matched portfolio consists of a long position in one of firms from the large
dividend increase samples and short position in the appropriate firm from the matched
control portfolio.  The return to each matched pair is
                                                                                                        (9)Rhpt  Rijt  Rckt,
where
Rijt = return to large dividend increase firm j,
Rckt = return to the control firm k matched to firm j, and
Rhpt = return to the matched position comprised of a long position in firm j and a short 
position in firm k.  The return to the matched portfolio is calculated as
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                                                                                                          (10)Rht  Rit  Rct,
where
Rht = return to the matched portfolio,
Rit = return to the large dividend increase portfolio, and
Rct = return to the control portfolio.
The market model parameters for the matched pairs were estimated using the OLS
procedure previously described by equation (7).  The parameter estimation period was
from day 430 to day 31.   The cumulative prediction errors (CPEs) were calculated by
summing prediction errors as in equation (8) except that the prediction errors are summed
from day 1 to day 504.  Thus, prediction errors were summed over approximately two
years.  The mean (days 1, 504) CPEs and the Patell (1976) Z statistic were reported for
that same subsets as those for which the mean (days 1, 0) CPEs are reported and which
were previously described.
The matched portfolios approach was used to control for systematic risk, industry
wide structural changes, and size effects.  This is particularly appropriate because the
paper’s conclusions are based upon comparisons of abnormal performance of high agency
motivation and high signaling motivation samples.  If systematic risk, industry specific
structural change, or typical firm size differs between these two samples, a bias would
have been introduced.
The Controlled Mean Value of Abnormal Percentage Spread (CMAS)
Following Tripathy and Rao (1992) and others, the daily percentage spread was 
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calculated for each firm as




The numerator of the daily percentage spread is the "inside" spread (highest bid and
lowest ask) at the daily close.  Percentage spreads rather than dollar spreads were
examined in order to eliminate scale effects caused by differing stock prices and changes
in stock price levels across time.  To identify the timing and magnitude of bid-ask spread
responses to dividend announcements, the paper will estimate "normal" or expected
spread according to the comparison period method of Tripathy and Rao (1992).  The
average comparison period spread for a particular stock should compensate dealers for
holding costs, order costs, and adverse information costs for that particular stock.  The
last day of the benchmark period precedes the dividend declaration by 30 days.  This is
due to a possible increase in information asymmetry prior to a dividend announcement. 
Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) find information asymmetry increases before earnings or
dividend announcements that follow another announcements by at least ten days but no
more than thirty days.  However, Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) do not find significant
increases in asymmetry for announcements that do not follow another announcement in
the prior thirty days for announcements or for joint announcements of earnings and
dividends.  Additionally, Mitra and Rashid (1997) find that average percentage spreads
increase significantly prior to dividend initiations.  However, Brooks (1994) finds that
spreads before dividend increases are not significantly different than those of a nonevent
period.
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4See CRSP Stock File Guide, Version 1996.S01, p. 33.
Closing bid-ask quotes are available on the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database,
made available by the NYSE.  Issues of the TAQ CD-ROM database are available
starting January of 1993.  The CRSP documentation indicates that the tapes carry reliable
bid-ask quotes for NASDAQ National Market securities only.4  CRSP secondary prices
may be either closing bid and ask prices, or the highest and lowest transaction prices of
the day.  The TAQ database provides quotes for New York Stock Exchange, American
Stock Exchange, NASDAQ National Market System, and SmallCap securities.
 In this study, the comparison period begins 429 trading days before the dividend
declaration and ends trading 30 days before the declaration.  The minimum comparison
period is 200 days.  The abnormal percentage spread for stock i on day t is
                                                                                                   (12)ASit  Sit  MSCi,
where Sit is the spread on day t and MSCi is the mean value of the percentage spread for
the stock during the comparison period and is calculated as:




The mean value of the abnormal percentage spread (MASi) over a two day window (1,
0), with the declaration date of the dividend change set at 1, will be computed as:





In order to provide some control for systematic risk, industry wide structural
changes, size effects, and stock market price trends, the difference between the MASs for
each dividend increase firm i and each control firm k was used to test the bid-ask
percentage spread reaction to the dividend increases.  Notice that a stock price trend
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effects the denominator of the percentage spread as determined in equation (11) in a
manner unrelated to decisions of the market maker.  The same control firms used to
calculate the matched portfolio (days 1, 504) CPEs were used for this purpose.  Thus,
the controlled mean abnormal spread is calculated as
                                                                                        (15)CMASi  MASi  MASk.
The mean (days 1, 0) CMASs and both the t-test for a zero mean controlled abnormal
spread and the nonparametric sign test are reported for the same subsets as those for
which the mean (days 1, 0) and (days 1, 504) CPES are reported and which were
previously described.
Change in Relative Spread (CHGSPD)
Because the use of control firms may introduce noise into the micromarket
methodology and because spreads may increase around any event which causes large
price changes (see Morse and Ushman 1983), relative spread is also tested over an
intermediate length time period that excludes a short-period around the actual dividend
increase announcement.  The measure used to measure the change in relative spread is the
ratio of the average relative spread from day 40 to day 20 (a 21 day period) and average
closing price from day 20 to day 40.  The TAQ database provided the required
information.
Change in Trading Volume (CHGVOL)
The average daily share trading volume over the 20-day period ending one day
prior to the dividend declaration (day 21 to day 2) divided by the average daily share
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trading volume over the 20-day period beginning two trading days after the declaration
(day 1 to day 20) is used as a measure of the change in trading volume and is used as a
control in EGLS procedures using (days 1, 0) CMAS.  The daily trading volume was
obtained from the CRSP datafile.
Change in Return Variance (CHGRVAR)
Using the daily trading volume records from the CRSP datafiles, the 20-day
variance of returns from day 1 to day 20 divided by the 20-day variance of returns from
day 21 to day 2 is used to measure the change in return variance and is used as a
control in EGLS procedures using (days 1, 0) CMAS.
Change in Closing Price (CHGPRC)
The ratio of average closing price (or Bid/Ask Average) from day 21 to day 2
to average closing price from day 1 to day 20 is used to measure stock price change and is
used as a control in EGLS procedures using (days 1, 0) CMAS.  The CRSP primary
price files provided the required information.
Intermediate-term Change in Trading Volume (ICHGVOL)
The average daily share trading volume over the 21-day period ending twenty days
prior to the dividend declaration (day 40 to day 20) divided by the average daily share
trading volume over the 21-day period beginning twenty trading days after the declaration
(day 20 to day 40) is used as a measure of the change in trading volume and is used as a
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control in EGLS procedures using CHGSPD.  The daily trading volume was obtained
from the CRSP datafile.
Intermediate-term Change in Return Variance (ICHGRVAR)
Using the daily trading volume records from the CRSP datafiles, the 21-day
variance of returns from day 20 to day 40 divided by the 21-day variance of returns from
day 20 to day 40 is used to measure the change in return variance and is used as a
control in EGLS procedures using CHGSPD.
Intermediate-term Change in Closing Price (ICHGPRC)
The ratio of average closing price (or Bid/Ask Average) from day 40 to day 20
to average closing price from day 20 to day 40 is used to measure stock price change and
is used as a control in EGLS procedures using (days 1, 0) CHGSPD.  The CRSP
primary price files provided the required information.
Estimated Generalized Least Squares Modeling of CPEs, CMASs, and CHGSPDs
Mean equally weighted market index CPEs, CMASs, and CHGSPDs were
compared based upon different partitions of the sample to determine whether there are
significant differences between mean (days 1, 0) CPEs, mean (days 1, 504) CPEs,
(days 1, 0) CMASs, and CHGSPDs of various segments of the sample.  In terms of the
motivation table, the tests compared Cells 1 and 4 from Table 1 and Cells 1 and 4 from
Table 2.  Estimated generalized least squares regression models were developed to detect
a difference between the CPEs, CMASs, and CHGSPDs of these two partitions.
72
An ordinary least squares approach to modeling the relationship between CPEs
and firm characteristics provides unbiased parameter estimates.  However, unless the
variance of error component is the same for each value of the firm characteristics,
standard errors are biased (see Sefcik and Thompson 1986).  Because of possible
hetroscedasticity when CPEs, CMASs, and CHGSPDs are used as the dependent variable
in cross sectional regressions, an EGLS procedure is used to “explain” abnormal
performance.  Following Ramanathan (1992, 350-351) and Judge et al. (1985, 439-441)
an estimated generalized least squares procedure (EGLS) is used to model equally
weighted market index cumulative prediction errors (CPEs), CMASs, and CHGSPDs
against the independent variables.  EGLS was used to model both the (days 1, 0) and
(days 1, 504) CPEs as well as the (days 1, 0) CMASs and CHGSPDs.  The procedure
has seven steps:
1. Estimate the model by ordinary least squares.
2. Compute the residuals and their squares.
3. In an auxiliary regression, estimate a model of the natural log of the squared
residuals against the independent variables, squares of the each of the variables
(quadratic terms), and cross-products of the variables.
4. Obtain predicted error variances by taking the antilog of the predicted logged
squared residuals.
5. Obtain predicted error standard deviations by taking the square root of the
predicted variances.
6. Obtain weights by taking the inverse of the predicted error standard deviations.
7. Obtain the estimated generalized least squares estimates by using the weights
obtained in step six in weighted least squares.
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Estimates obtained in this manner yield consistent estimates for the standard errors. 
Dummy variable DCL1T1 is coded such that 1 indicates membership in Cell 1 of
Table 1 (AGENCY1 events) and 0 indicates membership in Cell 4 of Table 1 (SIGNAL1
events).  Dummy variable DCL1T1 is used in the EGLS procedures involving the cells of
Table 1.  Dummy variable DCL1T2 is used in EGLS procedures involving the cells of
Table 2 and is coded such that 1 indicates membership in Cell 1 of Table 2 (AGENCY2
events) and 0 indicates otherwise.  The EGLS procedure is used to estimate the following
models for the (days 1, 0) window and (days 1, 504) CPEs:
          (16)CPEi  0  1 DCL1T1i  2 DIVYLDi  3 DIVCHGi  4 FCFi  i
and
          (17)CPEi  0  1 DCL1T2i  2 DIVYLDi  3 DIVCHGi  4 FCFi  i
The model of equation (16) is used to test hypotheses HS1 and HL1.  Equation (16) tests
the agency abatement theory of Figure 1 against cash flow signaling of the form of Pettit
(1972), Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) and
illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.  The model of equation (17) is used to test hypotheses
HS2 and HL2 in which agency abatement theory is tested against cash flow signaling of
the form illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 which is in the spirit of Eades (1982), Kale and
Noe (1990), and Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998).
FCF, DIVYLD, and DIVCHG are included as controls in all of the EGLS
procedures.  FCF is included as a control for two reasons.  First, the level of free cash
flow may vary inversely with the information content of dividend announcements.  Firms
with high levels of free cash flow can increase dividends more easily in the absence of
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permanent increases in cash flow.  Second, the level of free cash flow has been
hypothesized to increase overinvestment (see Jensen 1986).  DIVYLD is included
because announcement period excess returns are significantly related to yield (see Denis,
Denis, and Sarin 1994).  Because stock price reaction is significantly related to the
magnitude of the size of the dividend change (see Pettit 1972), DIVCHG is included as a
control.
The relationship between the (days 1, 0) CMAS and a number of independent
variables is examined cross-sectionally using estimated generalized least squares analysis
of the following form:
                (18)
CMASi  0  1 DCL1T1  2 DIVYLDi  3 DIVCHGi 4 FCFi
 5 CHGVOLi  6 CHGRVARi  7 CHGPRCi  i.
and
                (19)
CMASi  0  1 DCL1T2  2 DIVYLDi  3 DIVCHGi 4 FCFi
 5 CHGVOLi  6 CHGRVARi  7 CHGPRCi  i.
The model of equation (18) was used to test Hypothesis HM1 (agency abatement theory
of Figure 1 versus cash flow signaling of Figure 2 Panel A), while the model of equation
(19) was used to test Hypothesis HM2 (agency abatement theory of Figure 1 versus cash
flow signaling of Figure 2 Panel B).  Since the purpose of estimated generalized least
squares procedure in modeling CMAS is to determine the change in the adverse selection
component of spread, it is appropriate to control for changes in inventory holding and
order processing costs around the dividend announcement.  Therefore,  CHGVOL,
CHGRVAR, and CHGPRC are included as additional control variables.  Raman and
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Tripathy (1993) suggest that changes in trading volume, price variance, and stock price
can proxy and control for changes in holding and order-processing costs.
The relationship between CHGSPD and the independent variables is examined
cross-sectionally using estimated generalized least squares analysis of the following form:
           (20)
CHGSPDi  0  1 DCL1T1  2 DIVYLDi  3 DIVCHGi 4 FCFi
 5 ICHGVOLi  6 ICHGRVARi  7 ICHGPRCi  i.
and
           (21)
CHGSPDi  0  1 DCL1T2  2 DIVYLDi  3 DIVCHGi 4 FCFi
 5 ICHGVOLi  6 ICHGRVARi  7 ICHGPRCi  i.
The model of equation (20) was used to test Hypothesis HI1 (agency abatement theory of
Figure 1 versus cash flow signaling of Figure 2 Panel A), while the model of equation
(21) was used to test Hypothesis HI2 (agency abatement theory of Figure 1 versus cash
flow signaling of Figure 2 Panel B).   ICHGVOL, ICHGRVAR, and ICHGPRC are
included to control for changes in inventory holding and order processing costs around
the dividend announcement.
Chapter Summary
This study used event study methodology to examine the response of market
participants to dividend increase announcements.  The sample consisted of 1995 cash
dividend increases with a magnitude of at least ten percent.  After screening for data
availability and eliminating events with confounding events around announcement day, a
sample of 95 events was obtained.  The sampled firms were highly heterogeneous,
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including small and large firms.  Both industrial and service firms were included in the
sample.
Using Eventus software and the methodology of Mikkelson and Partch (1988) and
others, event CPEs with a (days 1, 0) window were estimated.  This methodology was
modified in the spirit of Karafiath, Mynatt, and Smith (1991) to estimate (days 1, 504)
CPEs.  A matched control portfolio of 93 firms was used to construct matched portfolios. 
This methodology helps to control systematic risk, industry specific structural changes,
and size effects.
Following a methodology similar to Tripathy and Rao (1992) and using the
matched control portfolio, (days 1, 0) CMASs were calculated.  Additionally,
CHGSPDs were determined.  Partitions of the dividend increase sample were constructed
using the existing agency abatement and cash flow signaling theories detailed in Chapter
II.  The partitions were designed to indicate firm’s likely motives for increasing
dividends.  Tables 1 and 2 illustrated the partitioning.  These partitions were used to
develop and test the research hypotheses.
Tests for significant stock price response were conducted for the entire sample
and the relevant partitions using Patell’s (1976) Z statistic.  Test for significant changes in
near-term bid-ask spreads for the sample and relevant partitions were conducted using the
single sample t-test and the nonparametric sign test.  The (days 1, 0) window CPEs were
modeled using estimated generalized least squares analysis in order to test the research





The results of the analysis of the data collected are presented in this chapter. 
Simple statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients are listed.  The (days 1, 0) and
(days 1, 504) CPEs and (days 1, 0) CMASs and their significance or lack thereof are
reported.  The results of  estimated generalized least squares regression modeling the
(days 1, 0) CPEs, (days 1, 504) CPEs, (days 1, 0) CMASs, and CHGSPDs are
presented.  The findings are also discussed in this chapter.
Simple Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Table 5 displays the simple statistics for the complete sample as well as events in
each of the cells from Tables 1 and 2.  The mean (days 1, 0) CPE of Cell 1, Table 1 
(AGENCY1 firm/events) is almost four times that for the complete sample.  The mean
(days 1, 0) CPE of Cell 4, Table 1 (SIGNAL1 firm/events) is essentially zero, while the
cell’s mean (days 1, 504) CPE is about 11 times lower than of the complete sample. 
The mean (days 1, 504) CPE of Cell 1, Table 2 (AGENCY2 firm/events) is about 15
percentage points higher than for the complete sample.  The mean (days 1, 504) of Cell
4, Table 2 (SIGNAL2 firm/events) is about 11 times lower than the complete sample.
Table 6 lists the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used to form
partitions or used in the regression models for the complete sample.  It should be noted  
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Table 5.  Simple Statistics
Panel A Complete Sample






(1, 0) CPEa 95 0.54 0.41 2.20 4.73 7.79 2.56
(1, 504) CPEb 93 1.15 3.90 48.48 131.30 144.71 46.45
CMAS 93 0.15956 0.05088 3.18539 9.95800 15.35977 1.23382
CHGSPD 95 0.93228 0.90245 0.21015 0.47383 1.60516 0.25195
TOBINQ 95 1.66484 1.32550 1.12593 0.11244 7.75471 1.19414
CHGCF 95 0.00812 0.00628 0.01674 0.03068 0.08495 0.01402
CHGCFVAR 95 12.56094 10.61535 244.47075 750.38408 1668.15856 60.66234
FCF 95 0.09911 0.09635 0.04781 0.01004 0.27785 0.05958
DIVYLD 95 2.14 2.03 0.77 0.75 4.07 1.05
DIVCHG 95 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.24 0.05
Panel B Cell 1, Table 1 Firm/Events (AGENCY1)






(1, 0) CPEa 14 2.02 1.82 2.67 2.35 7.79 2.61
(1, 504) CPEb 13 0.99 7.06 41.38 120.34 42.46 33.23
CMAS 13 0.40574 0.14759 0.59881 0.24219 1.71546 0.46016
CHGSPD 14 0.90694 0.93975 0.16231 0.66893 1.29672 0.17534
TOBINQ 14 0.92200 1.03033 0.32013 0.12170 1.29569 0.35179
CHGCF 14 0.00645 0.00315 0.00783 0.03068 0.00101 0.00597
CHGCFVAR 14 114.38223 21.13778 502.00519 750.38408 1668.15856 185.86956
FCF 14 0.07729 0.07448 0.05056 0.01004 0.17819 0.07026
DIVYLD 14 2.23 2.14 0.68 1.03 3.34 1.20
DIVCHG 14 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.02
aCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
bCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
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Table 5 Continued.  Simple Statistics
Panel C Cell 2, Table 1 Firm/Events






(1, 0) CPEa 11 0.71 0.87 1.64 1.80 3.95 2.45
(1, 504) CPEb 11 15.17 22.85 72.90 131.30 144.71 67.50
CMAS 11 0.61768 0.26887 5.29236 9.95800 9.07300 6.85608
CHGSPD 11 1.05025 1.06534 0.28946 0.69129 1.60516 0.49506
TOBINQ 11 2.25201 2.16243 0.82274 1.32550 4.19850 1.05692
CHGCF 11 0.00876 0.00784 0.00607 0.02185 0.00208 0.00923
CHGCFVAR 11 55.20522 1.68234 169.68566 504.41271 101.94262 109.30981
FCF 11 0.09496 0.09460 0.03669 0.03955 0.15292 0.06126
DIVYLD 11 2.35 2.15 0.87 1.20 3.92 1.54
DIVCHG 11 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.03
Panel D Cell 3, Table 1 Firm/Events






(1, 0) CPEa 33 0.47 0.13 1.83 2.87 5.15 2.26
(1, 504) CPEb 33 16.56 8.41 48.90 80.71 138.78 46.12
CMAS 33 0.43865 0.24244 2.80424 9.02629 10.95575 1.27814
CHGSPD 33 0.93234 0.88026 0.25378 0.47383 1.59701 0.35327
TOBINQ 33 0.93243 0.95448 0.28553 0.11244 1.32385 0.40859
CHGCF 33 0.01240 0.00778 0.01642 0.00028 0.08595 0.00859
CHGCFVAR 33 13.87385 17.63766 147.88975 469.82140 492.44069 41.05708
FCF 33 0.07520 0.08427 0.03372 0.01076 0.12617 0.05388
DIVYLD 33 2.48 2.28 0.73 1.28 4.07 0.93
DIVCHG 33 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.24 0.07
aCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
bCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
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Table 5 Continued.  Simple Statistics
Panel E Cell 4, Table 1 Firm/Events (SIGNAL1)






(1, 0) CPEa 37 0.01 0.05 2.28 4.73 5.83 2.03
(1, 504) CPEb 36 13.17 8.66 37.16 84.42 80.38 47.34
CMAS 36 0.05232 0.26344 3.32543 5.15213 15.35977 1.27412
CHGSPD 37 0.90675 0.90245 0.14178 0.58369 1.19915 0.18135
TOBINQ 37 2.42459 2.09786 1.26796 1.33776 7.75471 1.09638
CHGCF 37 0.01484 0.01023 0.01506 0.00003 0.07211 0.01433
CHGCFVAR 37 17.75764 -20.59095 177.50920 104.34235 1028.10000 48.54876
FCF 37 0.12992 0.12584 0.04440 0.06659 0.27785 0.05895
DIVYLD 37 1.73 1.65 0.62 0.75 3.81 0.73
DIVCHG 37 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.02
Panel F Cell 1, Table 2 Firm/Events (AGENCY2)






(1, 0) CPEa 20 1.42 1.34 2.46 2.87 7.79 3.20
(1, 504) CPEb 19 14.00 14.37 54.76 120.34 127.45 54.65
CMAS 19 0.32161 0.14759 3.43433 9.02629 10.95575 1.34436
CHGSPD 20 0.94373 0.94344 0.20189 0.68445 1.34939 0.34803
TOBINQ 20 0.91380 0.95086 0.29226 0.12170 1.29569 0.41248
CHGCF 20 0.00586 0.00036 0.02283 0.03068 0.08595 0.01320
CHGCFVAR 20 171.37274 40.05670 373.25437 0.01349 1668.15856 147.73124
FCF 20 0.07304 0.07448 0.04519 0.01004 0.17819 0.06160
DIVYLD 20 2.34 2.21 0.64 1.45 4.04 0.75
DIVCHG 20 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.04
aCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
bCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
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Table 5 Continued.  Simple Statistics
Panel G Cell 2, Table 2 Firm/Events






(1, 0) CPEa 17 0.25 0.53 1.99 2.86 5.10 2.10
(1, 504) CPEb 17 14.96 26.10 56.08 94.25 144.71 54.45
CMAS 17 1.37109 0.96410 4.17572 9.95800 9.07300 5.35167
CHGSPD 17 0.92019 0.93292 0.24492 0.58369 1.60516 0.31711
TOBINQ 17 2.19940 2.16243 0.72520 1.32550 3.83595 0.84011
CHGCF 17 0.00222 0.00197 0.01171 0.02185 0.02003 0.01359
CHGCFVAR 17 102.72313 28.42169 242.73689 0.41307 1028.10070 50.95319
FCF 17 0.11507 0.11264 0.03534 0.06103 0.16806 0.06296
DIVYLD 17 1.90 1.69 0.79 0.75 3.92 0.88
DIVCHG 17 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.03
Panel H Cell 3, Table 2 Firm/Events 






(1, 0) CPEa 27 0.57 0.13 1.96 2.35 5.68 2.28
(1, 504) CPEb 27 9.92 7.06 41.96 80.71 138.78 38.06
CMAS 27 0.50517 0.31022 1.29011 2.36049 4.51332 1.26448
CHGSPD 27 0.91073 0.87105 0.24983 0.47383 1.59701 0.27890
TOBINQ 27 0.94083 0.96828 0.29814 0.11244 1.32385 0.37740
CHGCF 27 0.00746 0.00638 0.01071 0.00962 0.04706 0.00827
CHGCFVAR 27 84.59040 31.16361 168.46506 750.38408 1.46504 41.37838
FCF 27 0.07788 0.08427 0.03430 0.01076 0.14088 0.04521
DIVYLD 27 2.46 2.42 0.78 1.03 4.07 0.99
DIVCHG 27 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.24 0.07
aCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
bCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
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Table 5 Continued.  Simple Statistics
Panel I Cell 4, Table 2 Firm/Events (SIGNAL2)






(1, 0) CPEa 31 0.10 0.05 2.28 4.73 5.83 2.15
(1, 504) CPEb 30 12.89 5.53 41.99 131.30 80.38 46.89
CMAS 30 0.61325 0.15263 3.47010 2.93066 15.35977 1.11838
CHGSPD 31 0.95029 0.90961 0.15984 0.71179 1.29868 0.18562
TOBINQ 31 2.48684 2.09786 1.36110 1.33776 7.75471 1.18868
CHGCF 31 0.01338 0.00955 0.01798 0.01438 0.07211 0.01872
CHGCFVAR 31 54.72638 34.49366 91.74200 504.4127 4.57967 28.86488
FCF 31 0.12566 0.12078 0.04952 0.03955 0.27785 0.04818
DIVYLD 31 1.86 1.80 0.70 0.87 3.81 0.82
DIVCHG 31 0.06 0.60 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.02
aCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
bCPE is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market index) over
days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally
be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
that the regressors DIVYLD and DIVCHG are highly positively correlated (p-value =
0.0001) as are FCF and CHGCF (p-value = 0.0011).  Additionally, FCF is highly
correlated with TOBINQ (p-value = 0.0001).  Although TOBINQ is not a regressor, it is
used to partition the sample and thus in the formation of the dummy variables.  Results
not reported here show that coefficients on dummy variables DCL1T1 and DCL1T2 are
similar when FCF is not included in the EGLS procedures.  FCF was retained in the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Findings and Discussion Involving (Day 1, 0) CPEs
The mean (days 1, 0) CPEs from the event study procedure are presented in
Table 7 with Patell’s (1976) Z statistic.  The (days 1, 0) CPEs for the entire sample are
positive and significant using both the value weighted and equally weighted indices.  The
initial stock price reaction to sampled dividend increase announcements is positive.  This
is consistent with Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Wansley et al. (1991),
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), and many others.
Table 7 also shows significantly positive (days 1, 0) CPEs for both the
subsample of firms with a 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a
nonpositive CHGCF (Table 1, Cell 1 events) and the subsample of firms with a 1994
Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a nonnegative CHGCFVAR (Table
2, Cell 1 events) using both the value weighted and equally weighted indices.  However,
(days -1, 0) CPEs 
were not significantly different from zero for both the partition of firms with a 1994
Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a positive CHGCF (Table 1, Cell 4 events) and 
the partition of firms with a 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a negative
CHGCFVAR (Table 2, Cell 4 events).
Table 8 shows the results of the first estimated generalized least squares 
regression.  To compare the initial stock price reaction to large dividend increase
announcements by Table 1, Cell 1 firms and Table 1, Cell 4 firms, a dummy variable
(DCL1T1) is included (0 = Cell 4, 1 = Cell 1).  The estimated coefficient on DCL1T1
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indicates the change in the intercept for Cell 1 firms relative to Cell 4 firms.  Again, firms
in Cell 1 are considered to be those whose dividend decision is motivated by the
Table 7.  Mean (Days 1, 0) Cumulative Prediction Errors for a Sample of 95 Dividend
















AGENCY1 events (Table 1, Cell 1) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample





AGENCY2 events (Table 2, Cell 1) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample





SIGNAL1 events (Table 1, Cell 4) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a





SIGNAL2 events (Table 2, Cell 4) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a





*** denotes significance at the 0.001 level.
** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
Note: The test statistic using standardized abnormal returns follows Patell (1976).
owner/manager agency problem but not by cash flow signaling and firms in Cell 4 are
believed to be motivated by cash flow signaling and not by agency abatement. 
Examining the results concerning firms in Cells 1 and 4 of the motivation table provides
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the highest possibility of distinguishing between the agency abatement and cash flow
signaling theories.
Table 8. Test of Hypothesis HS1 (Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results for Event-Time Interval, Days 1 Through 0,
Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4 Only.
CPEi = 0 + 1DCL1T1i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + i
N: 51   Adjusted R 2: 0.2776    F-value: 5.80   Prob > F: 0.0007
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept  1.48100   1.12 0.2671
DCL1T1a  2.35070 3.04 0.0039
DIVYLD 0.94611   1.32 0.1937
DIVCHG 13.57667 0.65 0.5163
FCF 5.48470   0.83 0.4094
aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 1 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 1 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
7.34897 for DIVYLD.  The mean variance inflation factor is 4.57941.
Note:  CPEi is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market
index) for firm/event i over days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration
date.  Day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
The significantly positive coefficient on DCL1T1 (p-value of 0.0039) indicates
significantly more favorable stock price reaction for Cell 1, Table 1 firm/events, after
controlling for yield,  price-standardized dividend change, and free cash flow.  Thus,
Hypothesis HS10 is rejected.  This result supports the agency abatement hypothesis over
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the cash flow signaling hypothesis in explaining (days 1, 0) CPEs.  The version of cash
flow signaling not supported by this result is the version developed by Pettit (1972),
Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) that
suggests dividend increases signal information about the level of future cash flows.  
There is strong evidence (p-value of 0.0039 on the DCL1T1 coefficient) that there is a
significant difference between the initial stock price reaction to sampled dividend
increase announcement of firms without motivation to signal a change in the level of cash
flows but with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and
firms with a motivation to signal a change in the level of cash flows but without a strong
need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem when  yield,  price-
standardized dividend change, and free cash flow are controlled.
The variance inflation factors (VIFs) for this model indicate collinearity problems
since the VIF for DIVYLD is 7.34897 and the mean VIF is 4.57941.  Multicollinearity
tends to reduce the size of the t-statistics.
The regression results in Table 9 indicate that none of the independent variables
explain the (days 1, 0) CPEs.  Hence, the model is unable to distinguish the stock price 
reaction to announcements by firms in Table 2, Cell 1 from firms in Table 2, Cell 4. 
Hypothesis HS20 is not rejected.  It is not concluded that there is a significant difference
between the initial stock price reaction to sampled dividend increase announcements of
firms without motivation to signal a change in the stability of cash flows but with a strong 
need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and firms with a motivation to
signal a change in the stability of cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
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shareholder/manager agency problem.  This result fails to support either the agency
abatement theory or the cash flow signaling hypothesis.  Again, the difference between
Table 1 and Table 2 is that Table 1 reflects the theory that firms signal a change in the 
Table 9. Test of Hypothesis HS2 (Table 2, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results for Event-Time Interval, Days 1 Through 0,
Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4 Only.
CPEi = 0 + 1DCL1T2i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + i
N: 51   Adjusted R 2: 0.0432    F-value: 1.56   Prob > F: 0.1996
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept  0.07096   0.05 0.9597
DCL1T2a  0.80029 1.08 0.2873
DIVYLD 0.53764   0.92 0.3610
DIVCHG 3.89763 0.27 0.7851
FCF 3.21902   0.55 0.5866
aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 2 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 2 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
2.12901 for DIVCGH.  The mean variance inflation factor is 1.88132.
Note:  CPEi is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market
index) for firm/event i over days 1 and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration
date.  Day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
level of cash flows through dividend changes, while Table 2 embodies the theory that the
signal is of a change in the stability of cash flows.
Findings and Discussion Involving (Day 1, 504) CPEs
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The mean (1, 504) CPEs from the two-year window event study process and
Patell’s (1976) Z statistic are presented in Table 10.  For the entire sample of 93 matched
pairs, the CPEs are not significantly different from zero using either the value weighted or
equally weighted indices.  The test statistic fails to indicate either a post-announcement 
Table 10.  Mean (Days 1, 504) Cumulative Prediction Errors for a Sample of 93















AGENCY1 events (Table 1, Cell 1) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample





AGENCY2 events (Table 2, Cell 1) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample






SIGNAL1 events (Table 1, Cell 4) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a





SIGNAL2 events (Table 2, Cell 4) comprised of firms
with 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a





$ denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
Note: Each matched pair consists of a long position in one of the large dividend
increase firms and a short position in the matched firm.  Firms are matched on
Standard and Poors SIC code and total assets.
Note: The test statistic using standardized abnormal returns follows Patell (1976).
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drift or a reversal of the initial positive price reaction.  The small but significant long-
term positive drift found by Benartizi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) does not hold for this
sample.  Results for the complete sample fail to indicate a systematic pattern of long-term
reevaluation of the dividend increase announcement.
Additionally, Table 10 reports that the mean (1, 504) CPEs are not significantly
different than zero at the five percent level using either the equally weighted or the value
weighted indices for the following four subsamples:   firms with a nonpositive change in
cash flows and with a 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median (Table 1, Cell
1 events), firms with a nonnegative change in coefficient of variation of cash flows and 
with a 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median (Table 2, Cell 1 events),
firms with a positive change in cash flows and with a 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample
median (Table 1, Cell 4 events), and firms with a negative change in the coefficient of
variation of cash flows and with a 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median (Table 2,
Cell 4 events).
As seen in Table 11, the dummy variable on the long-term stock response is
significantly more positive for Cell 1, Table 1 firm/events than for Cell 4, Table 1
firm/events.  Hypothesis HL1 is rejected.  There is strong evidence (p-value of 0.0129 on
the DCL1T1 coefficient) that long-term stock price drift following sampled dividend
increase announcements among firms without a motivation to signal rising cash flows but
with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency conflict is significantly
different than that of firms with a motivation to signal rising cash flows but without a
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strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem when  yield,  price-
standardized dividend change, and free cash flow are controlled.  This results reported in
Table 11 support the agency abatement hypothesis over the cash flow signaling
hypothesis in explaining (days 1, 504) CPEs.  The version of cash flow signaling not
supported by this result is the version  suggesting that dividend increases signal
information about the level of future cash flows.
Table 11. Test of Hypothesis HL1 (Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results for Event-Time Interval, Days 1 Through 504,
Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4 Only.
CPEi = 0 + 1DCL1T1i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + i
N: 49   Adjusted R 2: 0.2742    F-value: 5.53  Prob > F: 0.0011
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept  77.94365   3.95 0.0003
DCL1T1a  30.59504 2.59 0.0129
DIVYLD 2.79856   0.33 0.7439
DIVCHG 551.67986 2.92 0.0055
FCF 257.33742   2.77 0.0082
aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 1 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 1 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
1.72387 for DIVYLD.  The mean variance inflation factor is 1.43110.
Note:  CPEi is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market
index) for firm/event i over days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration
date.  Day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
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The regression results in Table 12 show a significantly positive coefficient on
DCL1T2.  The results indicate a significantly higher (days 1, 504) CPE for Table 2, Cell
1 firm/events than for Table 2, Cell 4 firm/events, after controlling for yield,  price-
standardized dividend change, and free cash flow.  Thus, Hypothesis HL20 is rejected. 
There is strong evidence (p-value of 0.0084 on the DCL1T2 coefficient) that there is a
significant difference between the long-term stock price drift following sampled dividend
increase announcements of firms without motivation to signal a change in the stability of
cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem 
Table 12. Test of Hypothesis HL2 (Table 2, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results for Event-Time Interval, Days 1 Through 504,
Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4 Only.
CPEi = 0 + 1DCL1T2i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + i
N: 49   Adjusted R 2: 0.1887    F-value: 3.79   Prob > F: 0.0098
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept  72.36408   2.79 0.0078
DCL1T2a  41.19139 2.76 0.0084
DIVYLD 0.47403   0.04 0.9661
DIVCHG 227.93375 0.89 0.3790
FCF 349.66956   3.10 0.0033
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aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 2 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 2 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
2.24124 for DIVYLD.  The mean variance inflation factor is 1.77842.
Note:  CPEi is the cumulative prediction error (using the equally weighted market
index) for firm/event i over days 1 and 504, where day 1 is the dividend declaration
date.  Day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
and firms with a motivation to signal a change in the stability of cash flows but without a
strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem when  yield,  price-
standardized dividend change, and free cash flow are controlled.  This result supports the
agency abatement hypothesis over the cash flow signaling hypothesis in explaining (days
1, 504) CPEs.  The version of cash flow signaling not supported by this result is the
version developed by Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), Brick, Frierman, and Kim
(1998) in which dividend increases signal stability of cash flows.
Table 13.  Mean (Days 1, 0) Controlled Mean Abnormal Spreads for a Sample of 93





Complete sample, n = 93 matched pairs.
0.16%
(0.48)
AGENCY1 events (Table 1, Cell 1) comprised of firms with 1994
Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a nonpositive
CHGCF, n = 13 matched pairs.
0.41%
(2.44*)
AGENCY2 events (Table 2, Cell 1) comprised of firms with 1994
Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a nonnegative




SIGNAL1 events (Table 1, Cell 4) comprised of firms with 1994




SIGNAL2 events (Table 2, Cell 4) comprised of firms with 1994
Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a negative CHGCFVAR, n
= 30 matched pairs.
0.61%
(0.97)
* denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
Findings and Discussion Involving (Day 1, 0) CMASs
The mean (1, 0) CMASs from the micromarket event study process are
presented in Table 13 along with t-test results for the hypothesis that the mean CMAS is
zero.  For 
the entire sample of 93 matched pairs, the CMASs are not significantly different from
zero.  Additionally, the nonparametric sign test results reported in Table 14 indicate that,
for the complete sample, the probability that bid-ask spreads will narrow after dividend-
increase announcements is not significantly different than the probability that the spreads 
will widen.  One cannot say that probability that bid-ask spreads will narrow is different
than the probability that spreads will widen after sampled dividend increase
announcements.
Howe and Lin (1992) find that there is an inverse relationship between dividend
yield and bid-ask spreads.  This may represent a long-term equilibrium relationship. 
However, the results of this study using CMASs do not indicate an immediate movement
toward this possible long-term state.  This result is consistent with Brooks (1994).
Table 13 indicates that the mean (days 1, 0) CMAS are not significantly different
than zero for the subsamples of firms with a 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample
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median and a nonnegative CHGCFVAR (Table 2, Cell 1 events), firms with a 1994
Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a positive CHGCF (Table 1, Cell 4 events), and
firms with a 1994 Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a negative CHGCFVAR
(Table 2, Cell 4 events).
Table 13 indicates that the mean (days 1, 0) CMAS for the subsample of firms
with a 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a nonpositive CHGCF 
(Table 1, Cell 1 events) is significantly different than zero at the 0.01 level.  The mean
CMAS is 0.41%.  There is evidence (significance at the 0.05 level) that dividend increase
announcements result in an initial widening of bid-ask spreads among firms without a
motivation to signal rising cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency conflict.  However, this test upon the raw CMAS does not
use any of the standard controls for interpreting micromarket results.
The nonparametric sign test, as reported in Table 14, produced significant results
for several subsamples.  Table 14 shows that, for this subsample of Table 1, Cell 1
events, 
Table 14.  Nonparametric Sign Test of HO: P(+) = P() for Mean (Days 1, 0)
Controlled Mean Abnormal Spreads for a Sample of 93 Matched Pairs and Partitions. 
Partition









AGENCY1 events (Table 1, Cell 1) comprised of firms with
1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a
nonpositive CHGCF, n = 13 matched pairs.
T = 2
(0.022)
AGENCY2 events (Table 2, Cell 1) comprised of firms with
1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a
nonnegative CHGCFVAR, n = 19 matched pairs.
T = 6
(0.167)
SIGNAL1 events (Table 1, Cell 4) comprised of firms with 1994




SIGNAL2 events (Table 2, Cell 4) comprised of firms with 1994
Tobin’s Q above the sample median and a negative
CHGCFVAR, n = 30 matched pairs.
T = 21
(0.029)
Note:  Test statistic follows Conover (1980, 122-125).
the probability of a negative CMAS is significantly different than the probability of a
positive CMAS at the 0.05 level.  The evidence indicates that initially spreads are more
likely to widen than narrow after dividend increase announcements among firms without
motivation to signal a change in the level of cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate
the shareholder/manager agency problem.  However, the results show that spreads are
more likely to narrow than widen for firms in Cell 4 of both Tables 1 and 2 (p-value of
0.020).  Again, the results in Table 14 do not utilize standard micromarket controls for
inventory and holding cost.
The nonparametric sign test, as reported in Table 14, shows that the probability of
a positive CMAS is not significantly different than the probability of a negative CMAS
for  sampled events with a 1994 Tobin’s Q below or equal to the sample median and a
nonnegative CHGCFVAR (Table 2, Cell 1 events).  One cannot conclude that spreads are
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more likely to narrow than widen, or vice versa, after a dividend increase among firms
without a strong motivation to signal a change in the stability of cash flows.
The regression results in Tables 15 and 16 indicate that none of the independent
variables explain the (days 1, 0) CMASs.  Hence, the model in Table 15 is unable to
distinguish the bid-ask spread reaction to announcements by firms in Table 1, Cell 1 from
firms in Table 1, Cell 4.  Likewise, the model in Table 16 is not able to differentiate the
bid-ask spread response to dividend increase announcements by firms in Table 2, Cell 1
from firms in Table 2, Cell 4.   Hypotheses HM10 and HM20 are not rejected.  It is not
concluded that there is a significant difference between the bid-ask spread reaction to
sampled dividend increase announcements of firms without motivation to signal a change
in the level of cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager
agency problem and firms with a motivation to signal a change an increase in the level of
cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency
problem. Neither is it concluded that there is a significant difference between the initial
bid-ask 
spread response to sampled dividend increase announcements of firms without
motivation to signal a change in the stability of cash flows but with a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and firms with a motivation to signal a
change in the stability of cash flows but without a strong need to  mitigate the
shareholder/manager 
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Table 15. Test of Hypothesis HM1 (Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results for Event-Time Interval, Days 1 Through 0,
Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4 Only.
CMASi = 0 + 1DCL1T1i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + 5CHGVOL
            + 6CHGRVAR + 7CHGPRC + i
N: 49   Adjusted R 2: 0.1899    F-value: 1.37   Prob > F: 0.2427
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept 0.93562   0.19 0.8524
DCL1T1a  0.47931 0.80 0.4277
DIVYLD 0.69311   1.25 0.2182
DIVCHG 5.50468 0.38 0.7092
FCF 9.19874   1.37 0.1768
CHGVOL 0.46171 0.95 0.3487
CHGRVAR 0.02544 0.95 0.3501
CHGPRC 1.58438 0.33 0.7462
aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 1 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 1 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
13.18589 for CHGRVAR.  The mean variance inflation factor is 5.09611.
Note:  CMASi is the controlled mean abnormal spread for firm/event i over days 1
and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally be the
Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
agency problem.  Thus, the sampled results utilizing the CMAS fail to support either the
agency abatement theory or the cash flow signaling hypothesis.
Findings and Discussion Involving CHGSPDs
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Table 17 reports that the dummy variable, DCL1T1, is insignificant (p-value of
0.1146).  Whether the firm comes from Cell 1 or Cell 4 of Table 1 does not contribute to
Table 16. Test of Hypothesis HM2 (Table 2, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results for Event-Time Interval, Days 1 Through 0,
Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4 Only.
CMASi = 0 + 1DCL1T2i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + 5CHGVOL
            + 6CHGRVAR + 7CHGPRC + i
N: 49   Adjusted R 2: 0.1466    F-value: 1.01   Prob > F: 0.4408
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept  2.93736   0.50 0.6205
DCL1T2a  0.62635 1.04 0.3030
DIVYLD 0.28306 0.56 0.5768
DIVCHG 25.23916 1.56 0.1267
FCF 16.21670   2.31 0.0262
CHGVOL 0.31706 0.55 0.5846
CHGRVAR 0.04803 1.29 0.2027
CHGPRC 0.40826 0.08 0.9403
aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 2 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 2 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
3.06427 for DIVCHG.  The mean variance inflation factor is 2.03795.
Note:  CMASi is the controlled mean abnormal spread for firm/event i over days 1
and 0, where day 1 is the dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally be the
Wall Street Journal dividend announcement date.
the explanation of CHGSPD, given the other explanatory variables included in the model. 
Hypothesis HI1 is not rejected.  It is not concluded that there is a significant difference
between the intermediate-term relative bid-ask spread reaction to sampled dividend
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increase announcements of firms without motivation to signal a change in the level of
cash flows but with a strong need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem
and 
Table 17. Test of Hypothesis HI1 (Table 1, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results, Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4
Only.
CHGSPDi = 0 + 1DCL1T1i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + 5ICHGVOL
+ 6ICHGRVAR + 7ICHGPRC + i
N: 51   Adjusted R 2: 0.4378    F-value: 4.78   Prob > F: 0.0005
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept 0.16909   0.94 0.3543
DCL1T1a  0.07019 1.61 0.1146
DIVYLD 0.07218   2.26 0.0292
DIVCHG 1.29431 1.54 0.1314
FCF 0.24465   0.73 0.4678
ICHGVOL 0.05017 1.75 0.0880
ICHGRVAR 0.00974 0.86 0.3950
ICHGPRC 0.84576 4.64 <0.0001
aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 1 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 1 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
2.67435 for DIVYLD.  The mean variance inflation factor is 1.67619.
Note: CHGSPD is the ratio of mean relative spread from day 40 to day 20 (a 21 day
period) over mean relative spread from day -20 to day -40, where day 1 is the
dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal dividend
announcement date.
101
firms with a motivation to signal a change in the level of cash flows but without a strong
need to mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem.  This result fails to support
either the agency abatement theory or the cash flow signaling hypothesis.
The significantly negative coefficient on DCL1T2 reported in Table 18 indicates
that the ratio of post-announcement relative bid-ask spread to pre-announcement spread is
Table 18. Test of Hypothesis HI2 (Table 2, Cell 1 versus Cell 4).  Estimated
Generalized Least Squares Results, Sampled Firms Include Those in Cells 1 and 4
Only.
CHGSPDi = 0 + 1DCL1T2i + 2DIVYLDi + 3DIVCHGi + 4FCFi + 5ICHGVOL
+ 6ICHGRVAR + 7ICHGPRC + i
N: 51   Adjusted R 2: 0.5232    F-value: 8.84   Prob > F: <0.0001
Variable
Parameter
Estimate t-statistic Prob > t
Intercept 0.02736  0.16 0.8720
DCL1T2a  0.13866 3.90 0.0003
DIVYLD 0.10654   3.96 0.0003
DIVCHG 0.27720 0.58 0.5657
FCF 1.07788   3.27 0.0021
ICHGVOL 0.00996 0.38 0.7044
ICHGRVAR 0.01941 2.29 0.0270
ICHGPRC 1.05461 5.91 <0.0001
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aBinary variable is equal to 0 for events in Table 2 Cell 4, 1 for events in Table 2 Cell
1.
Note:  The highest variance inflation factor among the independent variables is
3.42037 for ICHGPRC.  The mean variance inflation factor is 2.49510.
Note: CHGSPD is the ratio of mean relative spread from day 40 to day 20 (a 21 day
period) over mean relative spread from day -20 to day -40, where day 1 is the
dividend declaration date.  Day 0 would normally be the Wall Street Journal dividend
announcement date.
smaller for Cell 1, Table 2 firm/events than for Cell 2, Table 2 firm/events, after
controlling for yield, price-standardized dividend change, free cash flow, and changes in
inventory holding and order processing costs around the dividend announcement. 
Hypothesis HI2 is rejected.  There is strong evidence (p-value of 0.0003 on the DCL1T2
coefficient) that there is a significant difference between the intermediate-term bid-ask
response following sampled dividend increase announcements of firms without
motivation to signal a change in the stability of cash flows but with a strong need to
mitigate the shareholder/manager agency problem and firms with a motivation to signal a
change in the stability of cash flows but without a strong need to mitigate the
shareholder/manager agency problem.  This result supports the agency abatement
hypothesis over the cash flow signaling hypothesis in explaining CHGSPDs.  The version
of cash flow signaling not supported by this result is the version suggesting that dividends
increases signal an increase in the stability of cash flows (see Eades 1982, Kale and Noe
1990, and Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998).
Chapter Summary
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Chapter IV presented the results of the statistical analysis of the sampled data and
tests of the all of the research hypotheses presented in Chapter III.  The (days 1, 0)
CPEs, (days 1, 504) CPEs, and (days 1, 0) CMASs as well as their significance or lack
of were reported.  The nonparametric sign test was used to test for a difference between
the probability that market makers will narrow bid-ask spreads and the probability that
they widen them following dividend increase announcements.  The results of estimated
generalized least squares regression modeling the (days 1, 0) CPEs, (days 1, 504)
CPEs, (days 1, 0) CMASs, and CHGSPDs are also given.
The research findings and discussions presented in this chapter were divided into
four sections according to whether the hypothesis tests involved the (days 1, 0) CPEs, 







Cell 1 response was
shown to be stronger than
Cell 4 response in tests of




(days 1, 504) CPEs, (days 1, 0) MASs, or CHGSPD.  A five percent criterion for
significance level was used consistently to test all hypotheses tests.  The following four
null research hypotheses (out of the eight tested) are rejected:  HS10, HL10, HL20, and
HI2.  Table 19 summarizes these results within the context of the motivation table.
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Table 7 reports that the equally weighted market index (days 1, 0) CPEs for
Cells 1 and 4 of Table 1 were 2.01% and 0.00% respectively.   The multivariate EGLS
results of Table 8 (p-value of 0.0039 for the coefficient on dummy variable DCL1T1)
confirm that these raw values are different after controlling for yield,  price-standardized
dividend change, and free cash flow.  Hence, hypothesis HS1 is rejected, supporting
agency abatement theory over cash flow signaling of the Panel A Figure 2 form.
Table 10 reported that the equally weighted market index (days 1, 504) CPEs for
Cells 1 and 4 of Table 1 were 0.98% and 13.17% respectively.   The multivariate
EGLS results of Table 11 (p-value of 0.0129 for the coefficient on dummy variable
DCL1T1) confirmed that these raw values are different after controlling for yield,  price-
standardized dividend change, and free cash flow.  Thus, hypothesis HL1 is rejected,
supporting agency abatement theory over cash flow signaling of the Panel A Figure 2
form.
Table 10 reports that the equally weighted market index (days 1, 504) CPEs for
Cells 1 and 4 of Table 2 were 14.00% and 12.89% respectively.   The multivariate
EGLS results of Table 12 (p-value of 0.0084 for the coefficient on dummy variable
DCL1T2) confirm that these raw values are different after controlling for yield,  price-
standardized dividend change, and free cash flow.  Hence, hypothesis HL2 is rejected,
supporting agency abatement theory over cash flow signaling of the Panel B Figure 2
form.
The multivariate EGLS results of Table 18 (p-value of 0.0003 for the coefficient
on dummy variable DCL1T2) show that CHGSPDs of Cell 1 and Cell 4 of Table 2 are
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different after controlling for yield,  price-standardized dividend change, free cash flow,
and market maker inventory and holding cost.  Therefore, hypothesis HL2 is rejected,
supporting agency abatement theory over cash flow signaling of the Panel B Figure 2
form.
Chapter I posed the research question, “Which of two hypotheses, the cash flow
signaling hypothesis or the agency abatement hypothesis, better explains the response of
stock market participants to large dividend announcements?”  EGLS modeling supports
the agency abatement hypothesis over the hypothesis that dividend increases indicate an
increase in the level of cash flows in explaining (days 1, 0) CPEs.  EGLS modeling was
unable to differentiate between the agency abatement hypothesis and the hypothesis that
dividend increases indicate a decrease in the volatility of cash flows in explaining (days
1, 0) CPEs.  EGLS results indicate that agency abatement explains (days 1, 504) CPEs
better than either of the two versions of cash flow signaling.  EGLS modeling was unable
to distinguish between the agency abatement and cash flow signaling hypothesis in
explaining (1, 0) CMASs.  EGLS modeling was unable to differentiate between the
agency abatement hypothesis and the hypothesis that dividend increases indicate an
increase in the level of cash flows in explaining CHGSPDs.  EGLS modeling supports the
agency abatement hypothesis over the hypothesis that dividend increases which indicate a
decrease in the volatility of cash flows help explain CHGSPDs.  The implications of these




This chapter summarizes the results, considers the broader implications of the
study, discusses the limitations of the research, and includes suggestions for further work.
Summary of Results
This work investigates the agency abatement and cash flow signaling explanations
for the positive association between the announcement of dividend increases and the
responses of stock market participants.  Evidence presented from the EGLS procedure is
consistent with the hypothesis that dividend increases are considered better news for
shareholders of firms motived by a significant agency problem than for firms believed to
be motivated by cash flow signaling.  Additionally, EGLS results using CHGSPD are
consistent with the hypothesis that dividend increases result in a relatively “more
favorable” shift in informational asymmetry between market makers and insiders when
the dividend increase is motivated by a reduction in the shareholder/ manager agency
problem than when the increases are motivated by signaling a decrease in the volatility of
cash flows.  As used here, “more favorable” means either a larger decrease in
informational asymmetry as reflection in the adverse information component of the
spreads or a smaller increase in informational asymmetry.
Specifically, the significantly positive coefficient (p-value of 0.0039) on the
binary variable used to distinguish between Cell 1 and Cell 4 firm/events from Table 1
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indicates that Cell 1 firm/events (SIGNAL1 firms) have higher two-day cumulative
prediction errors around the dividend increase announcement.  The well documented
positive stock price response to dividend increases appears to be driven primarily by
those firms with significant shareholder/manager agency conflict.   These results support
the agency abatement hypothesis (illustrated in Figure 1 of Chapter III) over the cash flow
signaling hypothesis of the form proposed by Pettit (1972), Bhattacharya (1979), John
and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) (illustrated in Panel A Figure 2 of
Chapter III).   The results are also consistent with the results of Lang and Litzenberger
(1989).  However, the EGLS procedure using (days 1, 0) CPEs is not able to distinguish
between the agency abatement hypothesis and the cash flow signaling hypothesis of the
form proposed by Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), Brick, Frierman, and Kim (1998)
and illustrated in Panel B Figure 2 of Chapter III.
Results from the EGLS procedures employing (days 1, 504) CPEs as the
dependent variable support the agency abatement hypothesis over both versions of the
cash flow signaling hypothesis (both Panels A and B of Figure 2).  The results indicate a
systematic pattern of long-term reevaluation of the dividend increase announcement. 
This is indicated by the p-values of 0.0129 for the coefficient on dummy variable
DCL1T1 in Table 11 and 0.0084 for the coefficient on dummy variable DCL1T2 in Table
12.  The nature of this long-term reevaluation depends upon the apparent motive behind
the dividend increase.  The mean (days 1, 504) CPE is higher for the firms motivated by
reducing the shareholder/manager agency conflict than for firms motived by cash flow
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signaling even after controlling for yield,  price-standardized dividend change, and free
cash flow.
The results using CMASs fail to indicate that any immediate resolution of
information asymmetry between market makers and insiders from dividend increase
announcements differs between firms motivated by agency abatement and firms
motivated by cash flow signaling.  The results indicate that the dummy variables used for
distinguishing between firms motivated by agency abatement and cash flow signaling do
not explain (1, 0) CMASs.
In contrast to results using CMASs, results using CHGSPDs indicate a difference
in reaction by market makers to dividend increases between firms motivated by agency
abatement and firms motivated by signaling a decrease in the volatility of cash flows. 
This is indicated by the p-value of 0.0003 for the coefficient on dummy variable DCL1T2
in Table 18.  This result supports the agency abatement hypothesis over the cash flow
signaling hypothesis of the form proposed by Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), Brick,
Frierman, and Kim (1998) and illustrated in Panel B Figure 2 of Chapter III.
Limitations of the Research
This study tests the agency abatement and cash flow signaling hypotheses.  The
study has yielded some statistically significant associations; causal interpretations,
however, cannot be proven.  Conclusions drawn from this study should be tempered by
the limitations in the theories, the proxies for agency and signaling, the sample selection
process, the time period chosen, and the assumptions utilized.  For example, the “event
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study” methodologies used in this study can be viewed as  “joint tests” in that they also
test both the estimation methodologies and the assumptions behind the methodologies.
The proxy for the unobservable Tobin’s Q is particularly limited in that the
replacement cost of assets is not observable and must be approximated.  The proxy used
follows Lewellen and  Badrinath (1997) who illustrate that their methodology is superior
to previous Tobin’s Q procedures.  This study cannot determine whether the Tobin’s Q
variable that was used is the appropriate variable to detect agency costs.  However, the
results do indicate that investor response to large dividend increase announcements
depends, in part, upon the underlying characteristic that the Tobin’s Q measure captures.
Additionally, the sample selection process used may yield large firm and healthy
firm biases.  The sampling process outlined in Chapter 3 dictated the availability of data
from Compustat PC Plus.  This requirement may eliminate some smaller firms and firms
that do not report financial results on a timely basis (which tend to be unhealthy firms).
Suggestions for Further Research
As discussed in Chapter 2, Howe and Lin (1992) found an inverse relationship
between dividend yield and bid-ask spreads after controlling for other determinants of the
spread.  They did not attempt to distinguish between the agency abatement and cash flow
signaling hypothesis.  One line of potentially valuable research would be to see if this
inverse relationship holds equally for sample partitions similar to the partitions based
upon the agency and signaling proxies used in this work.
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The empirical results of this work suggest that the market greets dividend
increases by firms whose cash flow distribution is poised to improve as a nonevent.  That
is, they don’t appear to gain economically significant insight from these events.  These
results suggest a need for theoretical work that can explain the observations better than
existing signaling theory.  A promising direction for this thrust may be to combine the
insight of traditional cash flow signaling theory with the spirit of Rozeff (1982) and
Smith and Watts (1992) who provide evidence that there is a negative relationship
between growth options and dividends.  Their work suggests that firms who are
beginning to face limited growth options (mature firms) will increase their payout ratio,
to signal maturity and the return of cash rather than rising earnings and cash flow.  It may
be that this is the type of cash flow signal that the market takes to be good news.
In addition to bid and ask price quotes, market makers post bid and ask depth. 
The depth postings specify the maximum quantities for which the price quotes apply. 
Additional information concerning the possible reduction in informational asymmetry by
dividend increases may be gained by studying the depth responses among event partitions
similar in nature to those used in this study.
As an alternative to the controlled mean abnormal spread (CMAS) and post-event
spread to pre-event spread ratio (CHGSP) methodologies used in this study, spread
decomposition techniques of the nature of Huang and Stoll (1997) may be used to
measure the spread reaction to dividend increases.  Partitions similar to those used in this
study may provide additional incite into the agency abatement and cash flow signaling
hypotheses within a micromarket context.
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Another possible avenue for further research would be to apply the methodology
and partitioning scheme used in this work to a sample of dividend initiations.  Dividend
initiations may be less anticipated than dividend increases and thus may contain more
information. 
Conclusions
This study has investigated the reaction of market participants to dividend
increases.  This study contributes to the growing literature on dividend policy.  It also has
important implications for managers and their decision to place a portion of shareholder
wealth outside the firm.  The sampled short-term stock price responses suggest that
managers of firms with high levels of shareholder/manager agency conflict can increase
value for shareholders by increasing dividends.  The micromarket results provide some
support for the notion that dividend increases might increase value for shareholders in
firms with significant manager/shareholder agency problems by reducing the bid-ask
spread and therefore reduce the cost of capital.
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